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THE LIMITS OF PRIVATIZATEON: PRIVACY IN THE
CONTEXT OF TAx COLLECTION

INTRODUCTION

On November 19, 1995, President Clinton signed an appropriations bill establishing a pilot Program for private tax collection.'
The program allocates $13,000,000 for the Internal Revenue Service to hire private law firms and collection agencies to recover
overdue taxes.2 While many Senators praised the bill as an efficient and creative means of raising revenues,3 Senator Pryor made
the following observation:
For over 200 years, when the Federal Government has
imposed a tax, it has also assumed the responsibility, and
the blame, for collecting them. In fact, we have -an obligation to ensure that the privacy and confidentiality of every
American taxpayer is protected. Contracting out the tax
collection responsibilities of government would be in contradiction of that duty, and would, no doubt put the privacy
of all American taxpayers in jeopardy.4

This Note analyses whether there is a legal basis to Senator
Pryor's fear that privatizing federal tax collection threatens
taxpayers' privacy rights. It concludes that there is a basis for

1. See Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations Act, 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-52, 109 Stat. 468, 473. The Senate passed the bill on August 5, 1995
and the House of Representatives passed the bill on July 19, 1995. See 109 Stat at 513.
2. See 109 Stat. at 473-74.
3. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. S17,072 (daily ed. Nov. 15, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Grassley) ("I want to commend Senator Shelby for his work. This would not have happened were it not for Senator Shelby's efforts and his decision to put the interest of the
American taxpayer first and not listen to the voices of empire-building bureaucrats at the
IRS.").
4. 141 CONG. REc. S14,395 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (letter from Senators Pryor and
D'Amato to Senators Shelby and Kerrey) (emphasis added).
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apprehension because private tax collection is an impermissible
infringement on established statutory, constitutional, and tort law
privacy rights. Beyond raising serious questions about the legality
of the bill, this conclusion has implications for privatization more
generally. It suggests that there is a limit to the push for privatization, and that the limit rests in the realm of privacy rights.
In support of the above conclusions, this Note is divided into
five parts. The first section is an overview of existing tax collection measures and the proposed privatization changes. The discussion shows that the IRS has broad collection powers that are only
marginally checked by procedural safeguards, and that the privatization proposal significantly increases these powers. The second
section reviews the privatization debate, outlines three methods of
privatizing public services, and then considers the tax proposal in
light of this larger debate. The analysis shows that private tax
collection pushes the boundaries of the traditional privatization
debate and raises questions about the applicability of the usual
privatization policy rationales to tax collection. The third section
considers the statutory barriers to private tax collection and concludes that the existing nondisclosure rule is an obstacle that must
be overcome before the proposal can proceed. The fourth section
looks at the constitutional right to privacy. This section argues that
privatization of tax collection is an unconstitutional infringement
upon an individual's right to nondisclosure of private facts. The
final section is an analysis of tort issues. It argues that private tax
collectors will be liable for breaches of privacy unless they are
granted qualified immunity by being classified as government actors, but that it is unlikely that they will be classified as state
actors because doing so would be contrary to existing policy rationales for granting immunity. The overall conclusion is that the
proposal for the privatization of tax collection is contrary to existing statutory, constitutional, and tort law, and should be discarded.
I. TAx COLLECTION
A. Current Methods of Tax Collection
The IRS has several methods of collecting delinquent income
taxes. If a taxpayer does not pay or does not officially object to
the tax, the IRS can do any of the following: file a Notice of
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Federal Tax Lien;' serve a Notice of Levy;6 seize and sell property;' or begin backup withholding.8 As the following analysis indicates, these powers are extensive and only marginally controlled by
procedural safeguards.
In assessing a lien, the IRS can attach all property or rights to
property, including property that is acquired after the assessment is
made.9 Before doing so, the IRS is required to assess the tax, send
a notice and demand for payment, and the taxpayer must neglect
or refuse to pay the tax."' However, the IRS can bypass these

procedural safeguards if it believes that the collection of the tax is
threatened and immediate action is required."1 Beyond these minimal procedural requirements, "[n]othing more is required to make
the lien valid against the taxpayer and to subject property or property rights of the taxpayer to seizure by levy." 2 Once the procedural requirements are met, the IRS gains priority over other creditors when it files a Notice of Federal Tax Lien.' 3 The lien is released only when the taxes and fees are paid, otherwise satisfied or
become unenforceable, 4 a bond guaranteeing payment is issued
and accepted, or when the IRS fails to refile the lien within the
ten year statute of limitations.' 6 On rare occasions, a taxpayer can
successfully file an application for the discharge of the lien to
remove the lien against one specific piece of property.17
The IRS can also take property through levies. 8 In doing so,
the IRS can levy property that the taxpayer holds or that a third

5. See I.R.C. § 6321 (1994).
6. See § 6331(a).
7. See § 6331(b) (giving the IRS the authority, under § 6331(a), to seize and sell any
property upon which the IRS can levy).
S. See § 6331(b).
9. See Glass City Bank v. United States, 326 U.S. 265, 268 (1945).
10. See § 6303(a) (notice of assessment and demand for payment); § 6331(a) (taxpayer
must neglect or refuse to pay tax); § 6331(d) (additional requirement of notice prior to
levy).
11. See § 6303(b); see also § 6331(d) (excepting from the levy notice requirement
levies where the "Secretary has made a finding... that the collection of the tax is in
jeopardy").
12. MICHAEL D. ROSE & JOHN C. CHOMMi, FEDERAL INcoME TAXATION § 13.20, at
805 (3rd ed. 1988).
13. See § 6305.
14. See § 6325(a)(1).
15. See § 6325(a)(2).
16. "See § 6323(g)(3).
17. See § 6326(b).
18. See § 6331(a).
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party holds for the taxpayer.' The IRS can also place a levy on a
taxpayer's "wages (salary), commissions, the cash value of life
insurance, licenses or franchises, securities, contracts, demand notes,
accounts receivables, rental income, dividends, [or] retirement accounts."26 While most personal and real property can be levied,
there are limits. There are minimum weekly exemptions for income, and workmen's compensation and certain personal property
items cannot be subject to levies.21 The IRS does not need court
authorization to place a levy on a taxpayer's property, but must
make the required assessment and demand for payment before
sending a final notice of its intent to levy at least thirty days in
advance.' Like a lien, the levy is released if the tax, plus any
interest or penalties, is paid.2' The IRS also has discretion to release the lien if it creates an economic hardship,24 if the fair market value of the property exceeds the amount of the lien and releasing part would not hinder the collection of the tax,' or if the
taxpayer is able to provide documentation showing that releasing
the levy would aid in the collection of the tax by, for example,
allowing the sale of assets that would provide cash to pay the
26

tax.

The third means of recovering taxes is through seizures and
sales.' The IRS states that "[i]f you do not pay (or make arrangements to resolve) your tax debt, we may seize and sell any type of
real or personal property that you own or have an interest in (including residential and business property) to satisfy your tax
bill."26 The IRS is required to issue a notice of both the seizure
and sale to the taxpayer, 29 but actual receipt of the notice by the
taxpayer is not required." Before seizing property, a district or

19. See § 6331(a) (allowing a "levy upon all property and rights to property (except

such property as is exempt under section 6334)").
20. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, PuB. 594, UNDERSTANDING THE COLLECTION PROCESs 6 (1995).
21. See § 6334(a)(l)-(3), (7), (9).
22. See § 6331(d)(1)-(2).
23. See § 6343(a)(1)(A).
24. See § 6343(a)(1)(D).

25. See § 6343(a)(1)(E).
26. See § 6343(a)(1)(B).
27. See § 6335.
28. UNDERSTANDNG THE COLLECnON PROCESS, supra note 20, at 7.
29. See § 6335(a)-(b).
30. See Nonnenmacher v. United States, Civ. No. 91-6312-HO, 1993 WL 216146, at
*1, (D. Or. Jan. 18, 1993). Cf Pargament v. Fitzgerald, 272 F. Supp. 553 (S.D.N.Y.
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assistant director of the IRS must give approval and a taxpayer has
the right to an administrative review if the property at issue is
required to maintain the taxpayer's business."
Finally, the IRS can use backup withholding to satisfy outstanding taxes. 2 Under this system, the IRS notifies all those paying the taxpayer "to begin withholding income tax on these payments."33 If a taxpayer is subject to backup withholding, he or she

is required to notify all new payers; failure to do so may result in
a penalty or imprisonment for up to one year. 4 The IRS will
cease backup withholding if the income is properly reported, the
tax is paid, and the correct tax identification number is provided.'
Unlike other creditors, the IRS enjoys relative freedom from
court intervention. For example, IRS collection efforts cannot be
delayed by court proceedings.36 Under § 7421(a), "no suit for the
purpose of restraining... collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person."' This section therefore spe-

cifically prohibits a taxpayer from bringing a court action for the
purpose of restraining or delaying tax collection. Beyond the statutory prohibition, the Supreme Court also recognized the need for
38
broad government collection powers in Bull v. United States,
when it upheld a section of the Revenue Code under the rationale
that "taxes are the life-blood of government, and their prompt and
'
certain availability an imperious need."39
1967) (holding that actual notice is not required to be given to third parties who have an
interest in the property), affd 391 F.2d 934 (2d. Cir. 1968).
31. See id.
32. See § 6331(a), (e).
33. UNDERSTANDING THE COLLECTON PRocEss, supra note 20, at 8.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. Generally, the taxpayer can only appeal the deficiency finding before the collections process begins. The taxpayer is first encouraged to pursue administrative remedies,
and in fact, damages may be assessed against the taxpayer for not doing so. See §
6673(a)(1)(c). If not satisfied by the administrative outcome, the taxpayer has a limited
number of options. However, the taxpayer can only bring a suit in a federal district court
or the Court of Federal Claims if he or she pays the tax and then demands a refund. See
§ 7422(a). Therefore, the only recourse for a taxpayer who has not paid and who is not
yet subject to the collection procedures of the IRS is to bring a suit in the Tax Court. If
the taxpayer wins on appeal, he or she may receive reasonable litigation costs, including
attorney's fees, if it is found that the position of the government was not substantially
justified. See § 7430(a)(2), (c)(4)(A)(i). But see § 7430(c)(1)(B)(iii) (limiting the hourly
rate for attorney fees); § 7430(b)(4) (denying costs where prevailing party has unreasonably protracted the court proceedings).
37. § 7421(a).
38. 295 U.S. 247 (1935).
39. Id. at 259. Although § 7421(a) was not the subject of Bull, this case shows the
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There are also limited exceptions to the general rule that a
taxpayer cannot use the courts to restrain tax collection procedures.
An injunction is permitted when the deficiency notice requirements
of § 6212(a) have not been met; this includes the situation when a
prohibited notice is issued.' Although a notice must be issued,
the other administrative procedures are not always required. Under
§ 6861, the Commissioner is authorized to make an assessment
"prior to the exhaustion of the taxpayer's administrative remedies,
and in some instances, may assert the amount of the taxpayer's
liability against a transferee of property from the taxpayer under
section 6901." 4' An injunction may also be granted to the taxpayer to stop collection procedures "if it is clear that under no circumstances could the government ultimately prevail,"'42 extraordinary
circumstances cause irreparable harm, and there is no adequate
remedy at law.43
B. Privatizationof Tax Collection
The proposed reforms to the tax collection process would add
another weapon to the IRS arsenal. The pilot project gives the IRS
thirteen million dollars to "test whether private bill collectors could
do a better job than the agency's own employees."' The details
of the program have not been finalized with regard to protecting
confidentiality. As it stands, the law states that "[tihe Internal Revenue Service shall institute policies and procedures which will
safeguard the confidentiality of taxpayer information."'45 What is
known, however, is that the private collectors will be either collection agencies or private law firms who are granted the authority to
contact delinquent taxpayers.' They will not have the authority to

long-standing priority given to the government's ability to collect taxes.
40. See ROSE & CHOMMIE, supra note 12, § 13.18, at 803 (noting also that these
exceptions "preserve the taxpayer's right to litigate in the Tax Court").
41. Id. § 13.17, at 802.
42. See id. § 13.18, at 803 (citing Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370
U.S. 1 (1962)).
43. See Conforte v. United States, 125 B.R. 287, 291 (D. Nev. 1991) (discussing this
exception to § 7421 as a two part test "there must be clear evidence that the government

cannot prevail; and

. . .

the court must be satisfied that the threat of irreparable injury

for which there is no adequate legal remedy is substantial").
44. Robert D. Hershey, Jr., G.O.P. Wants IR.S. to Use Bill Collectors, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 26, 1995, at Dl.
45. Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations Act, 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-52, § 105, 109 Stat. 468, 476.
46. See 109 Stat. at 473.
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seize or levy property, but they will be able to use the collection
methods currently employed by the private sector in collecting
private debts.47 The Senate debates reveal that the authors of the
bill understood that private collectors would be given limited information: the name, address, social security number, and amount
owed to the government, and that private tax collectors would
49
be required to abide by the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.
The idea of private tax collection was first put forward by the
Clinton Administration in early 1993, but it received little attention.s° After the 1994 election, the idea gained significant support;
the current law was authored by Representative Jim Lightfoot of
Iowa and backed by Senator Richard C. Shelby of Alabama.'
Supporters of the law point to General Accounting Office statistics
that show that IRS collections have declined eight percent since
1990.52 They also point to the success of existing private collection systems in such states as Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Minnesota, and Nevada."
While there appears to be considerable political support among
Republicans for the privatization of tax collection, the IRS has
expressed its opposition to the proposal. The Commissioner of the
IRS, Margaret Milner-Richardson, stated that she has "grave reservations about starting down the path of using private contractors to
contact taxpayers regarding their delinquent tax debts." '4 Thus, it
appears that some individuals at the IRS recognize the additional
responsibilities and problems associated with the new weapon.

47. See § 104, 109 Stat. at 476 (stating that "the conduct of... any private sector
employees under contract . . .[must] compl[y] with subsection (a) of section 805 (relating
to communications in connection with debt collection) and section 806 (relating to harassment or abuse) of the Fair Debt Collections Practice Act") (citation omitted).
48. See 141 CONG. REc. S17,075 (daily ed. Nov. 15, 1995).
49. See § 104, 109 Stat. at 476.
50. See Hershey, supra note 44, at D8.

51. See id.
52. See id.
53. See id. (noting also that 10 other states utilize private agencies to make telephone
calls to delinquent taxpayers).
54. 141 CONG. REc. S17,074 (daily ed. Nov. 15, 1995) (Senator Pryor quoting Marga-

ret Milner-Richardson).
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II. PRIVATIZATION

A. Overview of the Privatization Debate
The privatization of public services is not new,55 but it is enjoying unprecedented support at all levels of govemment.O On the
international level, recent privatization in Eastern Europe and South
America is attributed to the decline of socialism and the subsequent
acceptance of the free market system.Y In Europe, privatization is
touted as a means of divesting government of money-losing facilities. In the United States, federal politicians and administrators
encourage privatization as a panacea for political and economic
ills. At both the state and local level, privatization is used as a
means of reducing costs and abiding by unfunded mandates created
by Congress.' In fact, "[c]ontracting out in the United States has
'
been employed most widely at the state and local levels."61
The most frequently cited argument in favor of privatization is
efficiency. This belief is articulated in the report of the President's
Commission on Privatization, when it states that "new arrangements
55. See Lisa Vecoli, The Politics of Privatization, 15 HAMLINE J. OF PUB. L. & POL'Y
243, 243 (1995) (noting that Christopher Columbus was a private contractor for the Spanish monarchs, and also that the Bank of the United States, the Homestead Act, and the
Pony Express were all privatizations of public services).
56. See COSMOS GRAHAM & TONY PROSSER, PRIVATIZING PUBLIC ENTERPRISES: CONSTiTUTIONS, THE STATE AND REGULATION IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECIVE 1 (1991) (stating

that "privatization is by no means a new phenomenon" but that the current "scale of
disposals does represent something quite new").
57. See Salvatore Zecchini, Introduction to 1 CENTRE FOR CO-OPERATION WITH EUROPEAN ECONOMIES

IN TRANSmON,

ORGANIZATION

FOR ECONOMIC

CO-OPERATION AND

DEVELOPMENT, TRENDS AND POLICIES IN PRIVATISATION 9, 9 (1993) (assessing the progress in privatization in developing countries and arguing that "[p]rivatization is a key
aspect of microeconomic structural reform. Private ownership and pluralism provides [sic]
an environment in which innovation is nurtured and risk-taking can be rewarded. This
setting can produce the economic dynamism that is required for the rebuilding of Central
and Eastern Europe.").
58. Selling the State, Contd, ECONOMIST, Dec. 9, 1995, at 16 (stating that Britons
"seem content with the performance of their privatised car makers and steel makers").
59. See, e.g., EMANUEL S. SAVAS, PRIVATIZATION: THE KEY TO BErrER GOVERNMENT
5 (1987) (arguing that privatization provides a remedy to many social and economic problems).
60. See, e.g., JOAN W. ALLEN ET AL., THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN STATE SERVICE DE-

LIVERY 2 (1989) (noting that the "use of the private sector to deliver public services has
exploded since 1978, when California voters passed Proposition 13, a major fiscal containment effort!).
61. THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON PRIVATIZATION, PRIVATIZATION: TOwARD MORE
EFFEcIVE GOVERNMENT 2 (1988) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COMMIsSION].
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between the government and the private sector might improve
efficiency while offering new opportunities and greater satisfaction
for the people served." 2 As this quote suggests, the efficiency
argument is twofold. First, it is believed that the money used to
employ services will be used more efficiently than if the government delivered the service. In other words, private parties will
compete for the contract and the party offering the most competitive price will be awarded the contract. The second part of the
argument is that the ultimate delivery of the service will also be
more efficient. This outcome-efficiency argument is based on the
belief that private actors are not subject to the red tape or bureaucracy of the public sector. Advocates of privatization argue that it
is easier for private parties to hire, transfer, promote, or reward
employees, purchase new equipment, and obtain approval for innovations from fewer layers of management.63
Despite the overwhelming support for privatization based on an
efficiency rationale, there is actually very little data to support this
widely-held belief." In a study of private sector delivery of state
services, the Council of State Governments concluded that "[m]ost
agencies that tested the use of private sector assistance did not
have adequate evidence on how costs or quality changed after they
implemented the new approach."
At least one critic is
not convinced that "based on the evidence thus far available...
privatization lowers costs in most instances." In fact, recent figures show that the federal government is increasing spending on private contractors but not decreasing its spending on government employees by a comparable rate.67 The obvious conclu-

62. Id. at 1.
63. See ALLEN Er AL., supra note 60, at 4.
64. But see Anthony E. Boardman & Aidan R. Vining, Ownership and Performance in
Competitive Environments: A Comparison of the Performance of Private, Mixed, and
State-Owned Enterprises, 32 J.L. & ECoN. 1, 26 (1989) (concluding that state-owned
enterprises perform worse than private corporations).
65. ALLEN, ET AL., supra note 60, at 164.
66. Harry P. Hatry, Privatization Presents Problems, 77 NAT'L CIVIC REv. 112, 113
(1988).
67. The federal government spent $114 billion on private contractors in 1995, which
was approximately $4 billion more than in 1994. See Jeff Gerth, As Payroll Shrinks,
Government's Costs For Contracts Rise, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1996, at Al. The federal
government has increased its spending on private contractors by 3.5% a year since 1993.
See id. This figure is significantly higher than the decline in payments to government
employees who were replaced by private contractors: the Government spent $103 billion
in salaries and expenses for its employees in 1995, which was a $1 billion payroll cut

from 1994. See id. This fact led Senator David Pryor to criticize federal contracting poli-
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sion, then, is that privatization's efficiency rationale is not a practical reality.

Beyond questions of efficiency, privatization is an outgrowth of
political and economic theory. Much of the current thought arose
out of Progressive political theory, which was popular in the United States at the turn of the century. Progressivism is sometimes
characterized as the "gospel of efficiency" because it believed that
efficiency would be achieved through consistent application of

science to social decisions.O Today privatization is often associated with the Reagan Revolution and Liberal economics. The Reagan Revolution promoted privatization and attacked "government as
the great impediment to the wisdom of the free market." 9 Simi-

larly, privatization embraces Liberal economic theory because it
claims that "the idea is to stimulate competition, unleash enterprise,
and bring the notion of profit fruitfully to bear on 'public' services
such as education and health no less than on 'private' ones."7 °
Support for privatization is also ideological. Many advocates of
privatization believe that less government is better. For example,
"In the 1980s, free marketers, like Reagan-appointee Emanuel

cies when he commented that "[the whole philosophy of beating our chest and saying
how fewer employees we have but never in the same breath saying look at how much
larger we are getting in the use of private contractors is not an honest portrayal of what's
going on with tax dollars." Id.
68. See PRESuDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 61, at 231. Progressive political theory
promoted the idea that:
[G]ovemment could be divided into two domains, one of politics and the other
of administration. Politics would be the realm of democratic government, where
value and other subjective questions not suitable for scientific resolution would
be answered. The larger part of government, however, would consist of administration. Here, politics and interest groups would be strictly excluded in favor
of professional expertise. Over time, it could be hoped that the expert domain
of government would expand, following the march of human progress (hence
"Progressive") under the banner of science.
Id. The Progressive school's emphasis on the division between politics and administration
suggests that government's involvement differs in the two spheres: administration requires
expertise and does not require the same degree of government involvement as the political
sphere. The Progressives' thinking is related to the larger political theory debate concerning the role of the individual in a democratic state, in which Liberal theorists argue that
individual decision making should only rarely be subordinated to collective decision making. See Ronald A. Cass, Privatization: Politics, Law, and Theory, 71 MARQ. L. REV.
449, 462-63 (1988) (discussing privatization in terms of Lockean principles of the individual); see also PRESIDENT's COMMSSION, supra note 61, at 233-236 (describing public
choice theorists' understanding of the role of privatization).
69. Vecoli, supra note 55, at 245.
70. Selling the State, Contd, supra note 58, at 14.
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Savas, were clearly motivated by ideology to support privatiza' They were "ideologically attracted
tion."71
to privatization as a
way to shrink government."

Therefore, ideological support is

based on understanding privatization not only as a means towards
an end, but also an end in and of itself.
Opposing these arguments are those people who do not subscribe to the efficiency rationale, the political theories, or the ideological support for privatization. Failing to accept these explanations, they see little reason for privatizing. 3 When considering the
efficiency argument, for example, some critics argue that the costs
associated with monitoring private contractors are an additional cost
that negates any relative gain from privatization.74 Moreover, critics fear that additional problems may arise from privatization.
Some of these problems are the increased potential for corruption,
the incentive to reduce service quality, the increased chance of
service interruption, and the possibility of reduced access to services for the disadvantaged." This Note suggests that in addition to
the often-cited practical and policy criticisms of privatization, there

also exists a legal limit to privatization.
B. Methods of Privatization
While privatization is on the rise because of changes in political and economic climates, the means of privatization remain constant. There are essentially three methods of privatizing public
services: selling government assets, using vouchers, or contracting
out.76 All three involve assigning what was a governmental func-

71. Vecoli, supra note 55, at 243. Emanuel S. Savas places the reasons in favor of
privatization into four categories: pragmatic, ideological, commercial, and populist. According to the pragmatic framework, privatization is necessary in order to achieve more effective public services. Although similar to the pragmatic argument, the ideological framework favors privatization because of an inherent belief that less government is better. Part
of this belief is based on the efficiency argument, but it is also based on other factors
and considerations. The commercial argument holds that government should support and
encourage business by directing its resources to the private rather than public sector. The
populist framework focuses less on the outcome benefits of privatization, and more on the
choices and power that privatization would give to the public in selecting services. See
SAvAs, supra note 59, at 5.
72. Vecoli, supra note 55, at 243.
73. See generally Cass, supra note 68 (describing rationales opposing privatization).
74. See generally Jonas Prager, Contracting-Ou: Theory and Policy, 25 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 73 (1992) (analyzing the economics of contracting-out and the monitoring costs associated with it).
75. See ALLEN Er AL., supra note 60, at 5-6.
76. See PREsIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 61, at 1-2. User fees are sometimes
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tion to the private sector, but the three methods differ in the degree to which they assign a government function to a private actor.
Selling government assets is an example of the most authority
that the government can give to the private sector. Selling assets
relinquishes complete control to a private party. The federal
government's sale of Conrail in 1987 is an example of a complete
divestiture through a public stock offering.' Government can also
maintain a degree of control by deciding not to sell the entire unit,
but rather to sell in a "piecemeal fashion;" this decision was made
in 1982 when the "federal government privatized the National
Consumer Cooperative Bank by relinquishing the asset value of
government-purchased stock and the associated right to name directors to the bank's board."78
The second method of privatizing is through the voucher system. Through this system, the government gives purchasing power
to the consumers, allowing the consumers to choose public service
providers. This system is a method of privatization because it relieves the government of the responsibility of providing a public
service. Although the government is not forced to provide the
service, it can simultaneously retain control by outlining the parameters for issuance and acceptance of the vouchers. Examples of the
voucher system are food stamps, housing vouchers, and higher
education vouchers for veterans after World War I79
The third method of privatization is contracting out. Under this
system, the government enters into contracts with private parties to
provide specific public services. Contracting out was first encouraged during President Eisenhower's presidency; the Eisenhower
administration stated that "the Federal government will not start or
carry on any commercial activity to provide a service or product
for its own use if such product or service can be procured from
private enterprise through ordinary business channels." 's° The government can contract out by either accepting the most competitive

classified as privatization because they transfer responsibility to the consumer. However,
they will not be treated as a method of privatization for this discussion because user fees
do not transfer government functions to the public. Similarly, deregulation is at times
classified as a method of privatization because it removes government control. However, it
will not be addressed here because removing government control is not the same as reassigning a government function.
77. See id.
78. Id.
79. See id. at 2.
80. Id. at 1.
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bid and then paying the contractor, or by awarding the contract to
a private party who will then be paid by the consuming public.
While contracting out can lead to considerable power and authority
being granted to a private party, governmental control is retained
because the government can decide not to renew the contract.
The decision to use one method of privatization over another is
dependent upon a number of factors. The most critical factor is
whether the government perceives the function as one that must be
either provided or produced by the government.8 If a providing
function is at issue, then all three forms of privatization are possible. On the other hand, if the function is one that must be produced by the government, then the privatization options narrow. 2
Production functions will more than likely take the form of contracts rather than sales or vouchers, because contracts allow a government to maintain a greater degree of control.
C. Privatization of Tax Collection within the Larger Debate

The privatization of tax collection pushes the boundaries of the
existing privatization debate in a number of important and interesting ways. Perhaps the most significant difference is that tax collection is inherently and traditionally a governmental function. Private
individuals or companies do not levy or collect taxes-only governments do. Tax collection is therefore unlike the existing programs and proposals that allow private companies to perform such
functions as garbage collection, education, public housing, postal
service, and public transportation.s'
81. See Prager, supra note 74, at 75; Jeffrey R. Henig, Privatization in the United
States: Theory and Practice, 104 PoL Scd. Q. 649, 664 (1989-90) (noting that "[i]n emphasizing the distinction between government responsibility and government provision,
privatization theory won greater acceptance for private-service delivery, but in the process
it reaffirmed the legitimacy of governmental intervention").
82. See Henig, supra note 81, at 664 ("In drawing parallels among such diverse techniques as asset sales, users' fees, vouchers, contracting out, and deregulation, privatization
theory... opened the field for subsequent shortcomings with specific initiatives to be
generalized to other privatization proposals.").
83. Senator Pryor made this distinction in his criticism of the proposal when he said.
We are about to privatize the collection of debts by the Internal Revenue Service. There is some form of privatizing that may be all right. . . . But, Mr.
President, privatizing a cafeteria and privatizing the confidential information to
be dispensed to the general public and to lawyers and debt collectors are two
different things. This is one area of privatizing that... I beg them to reconsider, to look at the potential for conflict, for harassment, for bounty hunters,
and for undue influence being used against unsuspecting and unprotected taxpayers.
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While tax collection is an inherent governmental function, it is
unclear what sub-type of governmental function it is. Private tax
collection is an interesting proposal precisely because it is neither a
producing nor a providing function. Tax collection does not provide a direct service comparable to garbage collection or fire protection; nor does it produce a specific good such as food or shelter
for the needy. 4 At the same time, it can be argued that tax collection does provide a service to everyone, since everyone must
pay taxes. It can also be argued that tax collection also produces a
good since it is the business of collecting money that will then be
distributed to the public.
Despite the difficulty of neatly fitting tax collection into either
category, it is not difficult to determine which type of privatization
option is best suited to the function. It is impossible to sell off the
tax collecting function of the government, since the government
must be able to collect taxes in order to survive. Similarly, it is
impossible to give people vouchers when the aim is to collect
taxes not to give money away. Therefore, the only option is to
contract out and to pay private parties to perform collection services.
The privatization of tax collection also pushes the boundaries
of the privatization debate because it grants a degree of power to
private parties that other programs have not previously done. Shifting tax-collecting authority to private parties grants them the coercive power of the federal government. Other programs have generally granted only the power to provide services, and often only at
a state level. Moreover, the potential effect of this movement is
larger than any other proposal: every citizen or person having an
income in the United States must pay federal taxes and must provide the IRS with detailed financial information. Because the reach
and scope of the IRS is extensive, the potential reach of the private tax collectors is as well.
The applicability of the efficiency rationale to tax collection is
particularly hard to assess for a number of reasons. For example,
assessing the efficiency of the privatization effort requires knowing

141 CONG. REc. S17,076 (daily ed. Nov. 15, 1995).
84. Garbage collection is not the same type of service as tax collection: while both are
"collecting," the goal of garbage collection is to help the public by keeping the towns
and cities clean, while the goal of tax collection is to take from the people in order to
fund the government. In other words, garbage collection is a direct benefit to the public
while tax collection is an indirect benefit to society through the government.
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the efficiency of the IRS. While there are estimates as to the cost
of collecting delinquent taxes, the exact costs are unknown and
remain very difficult to assess. Moreover, since the federal government has not yet privatized its collections processes, there are only
speculative costs to compare to the existing (but inadequate) IRS
figures. Monitoring costs may also be particularly high with private
tax collection compared to other government functions. Therefore,
the costs to the government may in fact be higher after privatization.&'
While private tax collection pushes the boundaries of the traditional privatization debate in a number of critical ways, the uniqueness of the proposal does not mean that it cannot or should not be
pursued. However, the following analysis illustrates that there are
legal and policy impediments to private tax collection that render
the proposal untenable.
6

I[. STATUTORY PRIVACYN

A. Background
When successfully enacted, statutes "provide evidence of
majoritarian sentiment regarding the legitimacy and importance of
particular facets of the rights of personhood and privacy. '"T However, the following brief historical analysis illustrates that majority
opinion, as evidenced by statutes governing the privacy of tax
return information, has not been consistent. In fact, these statutes
have vacillated between preferring disclosure and demanding nondisclosure of tax return information.
Public access to private tax return information has been a controversial issue in the United States since the Civil War. In 1862,
the Civil War Income Tax Act allowed the government to print
individuals' names and liabilities on posted notices; these notices
were open to public inspection for a fifteen day period.88 This
system was designed to "give the tax payer time to collect his

85. See Prager, supra note 74, at 100.
86. It should be noted that statutes are easily changed. As a result, the problems
inherent in privacy statutes do not necessarily render the privatization proposal
unworkable. However, the statutory problems must be recognized before they can be
changed. This section aims to identify the problems and to suggest the necessary changes.
87. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1311 (2nd ed. 1988).
88. See Richard D. Pomp, The Disclosure of State Corporate Income Tax Data: Turning the Clock Back to the Future, 22 CAPITAL U. L. REV. 373, 381 (1993).
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money in order to be ready when the collector arrives,"89 but it
quickly became a lightening rod for debate between those interested in public access and those championing individual privacy. In
1863, the Commissioner granted permission to newspapers to print
tax returns,' and the New York Tribune promptly published a list
of names and incomes."' The Commissioner defended the policy
reversal by arguing that publication would prevent the filing of
fraudulent returns.' As a result, publication of private tax returns
by newspapers
became commonplace by the end of the Civil
93

War.

The trend favoring disclosure reversed after the Civil War. In
1870, Congress decided that income tax return information should
not be published. 9' The 1894 Income Tax Act stated that "it shall
be unlawful for any person to print or publish in any manner
whatever not provided by law, any income return or any part
thereof." The 1913 Income Tax Act stated that tax returns could
be inspected by the public "[o]nly upon the order of the President,
under rules and regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary of the
Treasury and approved by the President."' Although the President
had discretionary power to allow for public access to private reports, it was Congress that debated and decided the issue.
Disclosure once again became the norm with the Revenue Act
of 1924, which required posting of the names and liabilities of
individuals and corporations filing reports.' While the official
position favored disclosure, it was not without its critics. In his
1924 annual message to Congress, President Coolidge stated that
disclosure of tax payer liability was "detrimental to the public
welfare and bound to decrease public revenues so that it ought to
be repealed." '8 Due to the opposition of President Coolidge and

89.
90.
FROM
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id.
See HARRY E. SMrTH, THE UNrTED STATES FEDERAL INTERNAL TAX HIsTORY
1861 TO 1871, 66 (1914).
See id at 67.
See id.
See id. at 382.
See Act of July 14, 1870, ch. 255, § 11, 16 Stat. 256, 259 (1870).
Pomp, supra note 88, at 384.
Id. at 389.
See Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, §257(b), 43 Stat. 253, 293 (1924).
Pomp, supra note 88, at 395.
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others, the law was changed to require the posting of taxpayers'
names and addresses, but not their liabilities. 99
The "Pink Slip Rebellion" epitomized the division between
those favoring disclosure and those favoring privacy. As a result of
an income tax scandal in 1934, Congressional efforts focused on
full disclosure of tax return information. Although they were not
successful in obtaining full disclosure, they were able to pass the
"pink slip requirements." Under this system, each taxpayer filled
out a pink slip with his or her "name and address, total gross
income, total deductions, net income, total credits, and tax liability."" These slips were to be made available to the public. The
response to the pink slip requirements was a highly organized and
effective taxpayer protest. The protest was successful, the pink slip
requirements were repealed, and no further attempts were made to
amend the law."°1 With the repeal of the pink slip requirements,
the 1924 law remained in effect and continued to allow the release
of tax return information.
The pendulum of public opinion changed direction once again
in the 1970s. Federal tax returns were public records in the 1970s:
indeed, Senator Weicker referred to the "lending library of confidential tax information," from which "a myriad of government
agencies have gained access to tax information of the IRS."'"
However, concerns about privacy gained momentum, and in 1974
Congress enacted the Privacy Act and created the Privacy Protection Study Commission."° With the passage of the Tax Reform
Act of 1976' ° Congress announced a general rule of non-disclosure of tax information.
A number of factors explain the adoption of the non-disclosure
rule in 1976. In part, the adoption of this rule reflected the growing majoritarian interest in privacy, as is evidenced by the enactment of the Privacy Act of 1974. The Privacy Act explicitly stated
that Congress found that "the right to privacy is a personal and

99. See id.
100. Id. at 399.
101. See id. at 402.
102. Stokwitz v. United States, 831 F.2d 893, 894 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting Senator
Wiecker in 122 CoNG. REC. 24,013 (1976)).
103. See Christine C. Pagano, Note, United States v. Richey: Disclosure of Tax Information hy Former IRS Agent Not Protected by the First Amendment, 22 GoLDEN GATE U.

L. REV. 143, 155 (1992).
104. Privacy Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1202, 90 Stat. 1525, 1667 (now codified at LR.C. § 6103 (1994)).
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fundamental right protected by the Constitution of the United
States."'"5 Another reason for the adoption of a non-disclosure
rule was to prevent other government agencies from obtaining IRS
information. Congress wanted to prevent this when "Congress had
not specifically considered whether the agencies which had access
to tax information should have had that access."'" Furthermore,
the Treasury Department released findings that publication and
disclosure of individual tax returns were "of slight benefit to the
Treasury in the prevention of tax evasion, which is the main argument advanced for such publicity.""° The Tax Reform Act of
1976, which is still in effect, states that "returns and return information shall be confidential" except as otherwise authorized.'"
B. Privacy under § 6103 and Freedom of Information Act
Despite this general rule of nondisclosure incorporated with the
Tax Reform Act of 1976, the tax code allows for disclosure to
people who have material interests in the specific returns or the
return information at issue."° Included in this category are people
whose tax information is at issue:"' partners of a partnership;.'
directors, officers, and shareholders of a corporation;" 2 or an administrator, executor, or trustee of an estate." 3 However, §
6103(e)(7) limits disclosure to those disclosures that "would not
seriously impair the Federal tax administration."". Thus, there are
significant exceptions to the general nondisclosure rule, but there
are also limitations to the exceptions."'
This web of limitations and exceptions is further complicated
by the existence of the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA")." 6
The FOIA was enacted to give individuals access to information

105. Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 2(a)(4), 88 Stat. 1896, 1896.
106. JoINT COMMITrE ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM
Acr OF 1976, 314 (1976).
107. Pomp, supra note 88, at 402 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 74-313, at 1 (1935)).
108. § 6103(a).
109. See id. § 6103(e).
110. See § 6103(e)(1)(A)(i).
111. See § 6103(e)(1)(C).
112. See § 6103(e)(1)(D).

113. See § 6103(e)(1)(E).
114. See § 6103(e)(1)(E).
115. See J. Hudson Duffalo, Note, The Buttoned Lip: The Controversy Surrounding the
Disclosure of Tax Return Information, 53 ALB. L. REv. 937, 956 (1989) (describing some
of the limitations to the exceptions).
116. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994).
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possessed by the government and to help prevent government
abuse."7 However, the government also recognized that it needed
to protect certain information from disclosure. The result is an
exception to the FOIA through § 6103 of the tax code that protects
from disclosure certain tax information."' Despite the explicit exception to the FOIA, the tension between the FOIA and § 6103
continues because some types of tax information may be disclosed.
In order to obtain tax information under the FOIA, the interested party must satisfy a two part test. The party must have a material interest in the information and the information requested must
not be "return information." The following provision of § 6103
generally defines "return information" as:
[A] taxpayer's identity, the nature, source, or amount of his
income, payments, receipts, deductions, exemptions, credits,
assets, liabilities, net worth, tax liability, tax withheld,
deficiencies, over assessments, or tax payments, whether the
taxpayer's return was, is being, or will be examined or
subject to other investigation or processing, or any other
data, received by, recorded by, prepared by, furnished to,
or collected by the Secretary with respect to a return or
with respect to the determination of the existence, or possible existence, of liability (or the amount thereof) of any
person under this title for any tax, penalty, interest, fine,
forfeiture, or other imposition, or offense." 9
Not included within this definition of return information is "data in
the form which cannot be associated with, or otherwise identify,
directly or indirectly, a particular taxpayer."'"
Much of the FOIA litigation has centered on the question of
whether the information sought to be released constitutes "return
information" that will identify a particular taxpayer. This
definitional problem was at issue in Long v. IRS, in which the
plaintiffs requested that the IRS release data relating to the Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program. The IRS released statistical

117. See Elena M. Gervino, Note, Tax Law-The Internal Revenue Code: Interpreting
the 'Haskel Amendment' to 26 U.S.C. § 6103--defining 'Return Information', 9 W. NEW
ENG. L. REV. 269, 269 (1987).
118. See § 6103.
119. § 6103(b)(2).
120. Gervino, supra note 117, at 273.
121. 596 F.2d 362 (9th Cir. 1979). Notwithstanding the fact that Long was overruled by
statute, it is an example of the definitional problems facing the courts.
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information, but refused to release check sheets containing
taxpayers' name, address, social security number, and financial
data, or the data tapes that included taxpayers' social security number and all financial information reported in a tax return.' The
IRS argued that the information contained on the check sheets and
data tapes constituted return information, and that the only information it could release was statistical information." z The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the IRS' arguments and held that
the information did not constitute return information." 4 The court
reasoned that return information was information that identified a
particular taxpayer, but that information did not necessarily have to
be in statistical form in order to be released."z
The Supreme Court's holding in Church of Scientology of CaL
v. IRS" calls the Ninth Circuit's ruling into question. In Church
of Scientology, the Supreme Court acknowledged that "[o]ne of the
major purposes in revising § 6103 was to tighten the restrictions
on the use of return information by entities other than [the
IRS]."' The Court affirmed the circuit court's reasoning that the
return information must be reformulated before disclosure, and that
it was not enough that the return information does not directly
identify the taxpayer."
Also contrary to the holding of Long is the Seventh Circuit's
formulation of "return information." In King v. IRS,'29 the court
refused to adopt the identity test outlined in Long and instead ruled
that all information must be in amalgamated form in order to ensure that it would not "directly or indirectly identify a specific
taxpayer."' 30 The Court feared that "extrinsic information" would
allow the taxpayer to be identified if individual returns were reviewed.'
In interpreting the breadth of § 6103, the courts have not expanded the exceptions to the general rule of nondisclosure. For
example, in Aronson v. IRS,' the District Court of Massachusetts
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

See id. at 364.
See id. at 365.
See id. at 368.
See id.
484 U.S. 9 (1987).
Id. at 16.
See id.
688 F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1982).
Id at 491.
See id.
767 F. Supp. 378 (D. Mass. 1991), affid in part and rev'd in part, 973 F.2d 962
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considered whether there existed an exception to nondisclosure
when the purpose of disclosure was to notify taxpayers of their
refunds. Aronson described himself as an attorney who "locates and
identifies unclaimed and apparently abandoned money and other
property held by state and federal governments" and then "attempts
to locate the individuals entitled to such property and offers his
services . .. to help them recover."'' He sought under the FOIA,
the names, addresses, and social security numbers of those taxpayers who had not received their refunds. The court recognized the
general policy in favor of disclosure under the FOIA, but also
noted that § 6103(b)(2) was an exception to the FOIA disclosure
rule.' Aronson acknowledged that return information was generally not available to the public, but argued instead that §
6103(m)(1) "provides otherwise in the case of disclosures concern135
ing unclaimed tax refunds.'
In trying to decide which information could be released, the
court went beyond mere statutory interpretation and engaged in a
balancing test."s The court noted that "Congress was concerned
not only with protecting the privacy of citizens in general, but,
specifically-as to information gathered for tax purposes-with the
effect which abuse of such information would have on public confidence in the confidentiality of tax information and on the selfreporting income tax system."'3 The court reasoned that while
there was a public interest in assuring that taxpayers received their
refunds, there was an equally strong interest in protecting
taxpayers' confidentiality.'
The court held that releasing the
names and last known mailing addresses of the taxpayers owed a
refund was permissible, but that Aronson was not entitled to disclosure of the taxpayers' social security numbers or the amounts of

(1st Cir. 1992).
133. Id. at 380.
134. See id. at 382.
135. Id. at 382 (noting that § 6103(m)(1) states that the "Secretary may disclose taxpayer identity information to the press and other media for purposes of notifying persons
entitled to tax refunds when the Secretary, after reasonable effort and lapse of time, has
been unable to locate such persons").

136. The court likened this case to one brought under Exemption 6 of the FOIA, which
establishes a two part test for determining when the disclosure of personnel or medical
records would be an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. The test "consider[s] both
the nature of the files and the warrant for the disclosure." Id. at 387 (referring to United
States Dep't of State v. Washington Post Co., 456 U.S. 595 (1982)).

137. Id. at 384.
138. See i. at 392.
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their refunds.'3 9 The court concluded that disclosure of social security numbers "would provide linkage to the vast amount of personal information already in data banks.""' Thus, the court limited disclosure based on its fear that the disclosure of some information could lead to the disclosure of other information that would
constitute an invasion of privacy.
Similarly, in Barrett v. United States 41 the IRS argued that
there was a necessity exception to the nondisclosure rule. Dr.
Barrett brought suit after the IRS sent a letter to his patients in an
attempt to gain additional financial information. The letter stated
that Dr. Barrett was "currently under investigation by the Criminal
Investigation Division of the Internal Revenue Service."'4 The
court of appeals rejected the government's argument that it was
necessary to inform the patients of the criminal investigation in
order to "obtain meaningful responses from third parties."'43 The
court reasoned that the government presented no evidence to support this contention, that in fact its testimony at trial contradicted
this proposition, and that criminal procedures encouraged third
parties to participate despite the additional information."4 After
rejecting the government's reasoning, the court ultimately granted
relief to Barrett because it concluded that the IRS agent was not
acting in good faith when he revealed the information. 45 Therefore, the Fifth Circuit rejected the IRS' arguments of necessity and
good faith; however, in doing so, the court recognized that an
objective, good faith standard may allow disclosure of tax records.
C. Implicationsfor Private Tax Collection
The above analysis has implications for the privatization of tax
collection. The first and most obvious implication is that under the
current statutory system privatization will be contrary to the general
rule of non-disclosure of § 6103. The type of information that
collection agencies will need is precisely the type of information
that is prohibited as "return information"---names, addresses, liabili-

139. See id. at 388. On appeal, however, the First Circuit reversed the decision compelling the IRS to disclose the mailing addresses. See Aronson v. IRS, 973 F.2d 962, 968
(lst Cir. 1992).
140. Id.
141. 51 F.3d 475, 478 (5th Cir. 1995).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. See id. at 478-79.
145. See id. at 480.
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ties, and social security numbers. It will be impossible to collect
taxes if private agencies are only given statistical or amalgamated
information, as required by Church of Scientology and King. Moreover, the more liberal interpretation outlined by the Aronson court
is inapplicable because it applied to tax refunds and not to tax
collection; the Code does not have an exception for tax collection
as it does for tax refunds."
Another implication of privatizing tax collection is that members of the public 47 may be able to bypass the general non-disclosure rule by riding on the coat-tails of the private tax collectors.
This is possible because once confidential information is made
available to the media or to an individual, it becomes widely available; under the FOIA "information available to anyone is information available to everyone."' " Section 6103(m)(1) allows for limited disclosure to the media in order to alert those taxpayers who
are entitled to a refund,4 and once it is made available to the
media, it is available to everyone. Therefore, an unintended consequence of the web of statutory provisions is that it may be possible for an individual to gain access to confidential information
after it is released to a collection agency or private tax collec50
tor.
It is relatively easy for Congress to change the statutory language to allow for disclosure to private agencies, and to add a
section that stipulates that disclosure to an agency does not constitute disclosure to the public. It is not easy, however, to simultaneously maintain the original policy rationales for nondisclosure.
The nondisclosure rule was originally implemented because finan-

146. It can also be assumed that individuals who are contacted because they are entitled
to a refund will more than likely react more favorably than those contacted because they

owe money.
147. The term "public" can refer to the media or other interested but non-essential
parties.
148. National Ass'n of Retired Fed. Employees v. Homer, 879 F.2d 873, 875 (D.C. Cir.

1989).
149. See § 6013(m)(1).

150. A further impediment to the general non-disclosure rule is the new discovery rules.
Because "the discovery provisions of the Federal Rules are to be read liberally and in
favor of broad pretrial discovery ... [d]iscovery of federal income tax returns ... involves a conflict between the taxpayer's privacy expectations and the policy favoring
broad civil discovery." William A. Edmundson, Discovery of Federal Income Tax Returns
and the New "Qualified" Privileges, 1984 DUKE LJ. 938, 938-39 (footnote omitted).
While many courts have adopted a qualified privilege for income tax returns, it is not
specifically listed as a privilege in the Rules. See id. at 939-40. Therefore, the prospect

for abuse remains.
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cial tax information was thought sufficiently personal to warrant
protection."' Expanding disclosure to private tax collectors implies that the government no longer considers tax information to be
highly sensitive or confidential. If it is no longer considered highly

confidential, then there is a greater likelihood that it will be disclosed to other government agencies or private individuals. Nondisclosure was implemented to prevent agencies other than the IRS
from obtaining information that Congress had not authorized them
to have, and to protect tax payers from needless public inquiry into
their private affairs.152 In sum, allowing disclosure to private tax
collectors essentially undermines the policy rationale behind the

nondisclosure rule.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS
A. Background

The constitutional right to privacy is a difficult and vigorously
debated issue.' While there is no explicit right to privacy in the
Constitution,5 4 the judicially defined right is now widely recognized. 5 5 Warren and Brandeis first developed the concept in 1890
when they argued that copyright law should be developed under a

privacy right doctrine rather than under a property right doe-

151. See supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text.
152. See id.

153. See TRIBE, supra note 87, at 1302 (stating that "[m]uch judicial and scholarly ink
has been spilt in the task of expounding this paradoxical right").
154. See id. at 1308. Tribe envisioned that
The Constitution was consecrated to the blessings of liberty for ourselves and
our posterity-yet it contains no discussion of the right to be a human being;,
no definition of a person; and, indeed, no express provisions guaranteeing to
persons the right to carry on their lives protected from the "vicissitudes of the
political process" by a zone of privacy or a right of personhood.
Id. (footnote omitted).
155. See Igneri v. Moore, 898 F.2d 870, 873 (2nd Cir. 1990) (recognizing that the
"constitutional right to privacy, although difficult to articulate precisely, has been firmly
established"); Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 5 v. City of Philadelphia, 812 F.2d
105, 109 (3rd Cir. 1987) (stating that "[it is now established that the United States Constitution provides some protection of an individual's privacy"); see also TRIBE, supra note
87, at 1308 (stating that the "judiciary has thus reached into the Constitution's spirit and
structure, and has elaborated from the spare text an idea of the 'human' and a conception
of 'being' not merely contemplated but required").
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trine. 56 They defined privacy as the "right to be let alone"'"
and as "the more general right to the immunity of the person-the
right to one's personality.' '5 8 While the Warren and Brandeis article is generally cited as the precursor to the tort of invasion of
privacy, 59 it is also considered the precursor to the constitutional

right to privacy.' 6°
The constitutional right to privacy is most often cited for its
protection of an individual's right to make decisions about family
and procreation issues.16 1 It is not, however, limited to these issues. Warren and Brandeis' definition suggests a wider area of
protection: not only did Warren and Brandeis refer to the right of
privacy very generally as the "right to be let alone,"' 62 but approximately forty years later Brandeis again referred to privacy as

"the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and
the right most valued by civilized men.'' 163
B. The Right to Nondisclosure of Private Facts
In 1976, the Supreme Court indirectly broadened the scope of
privacy to include control over personal information1 4 In Whalen
v. Roe, physicians and patients challenged the constitutionality of a

New York statute that required the state to maintain "in a central-

156. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193, 205-07 (1890).
157. Id at 193.
158. Id. at 207.
159. See David H. Flaherty, On the Utility of Constitutional Rights to Privacy and Data
Protection, 41 CAsE W. RES. L. REv. 831, 833 (1991) (noting "the acknowledged leading
role of American commentators in inventing the legal 'right to privacy' in the late nineteenth century and the extraordinary expansion of the scope of the right").
160. See United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. For Freedom of the Press,
489 U.S. 749, 763 (1989) (citing Warren and Brandeis in the Court's discussion of the
common law development of privacy rights); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,
478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (addressing, for one of the first times, the constitutional right of privacy), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967).
161. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976) (characterizing the majority of the
privacy decisions as "matters relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and education. In these areas it has been held that there are
limitations on the States' power to substantively regulate conduct").
162. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 156, at 193.
163. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
164. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977) (denying that any invasion of a
privacy right occurred, but nonetheless recognizing that a right to privacy existed in certain circumstances); TRI E, supra note 87, at 1389-90 (explaining that control over information "must be understood as a basic part of the right to shape the 'self' that one presents to the world, and on the basis of which the world in turn shapes one's existence").
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ized computer file, the names and addresses of all persons who
have obtained, pursuant to a doctor's prescription, certain drugs for
which there is both a lawful and an unlawful market."'65 Although the Court ultimately held that there was no invasion of
privacy, in considering the constitutionality of this statute, the
Court stated that there were two possible privacy interests: "the
individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters
and... the interest in independence in making certain kinds of
important decisions."'"
The Court established that the right to nondisclosure of private
information was a judicially created doctrine emanating from the
"undefined penumbra" of Constitutional protections.'67 The Court
stated that "[language in prior opinions of the Court or its individual Justices provides support for the view that some personal
rights... are so 'fundamental' that an undefined penumbra may
provide them with an independent source of constitutional protection." 1s In support of this statement, the Court quoted Justice
Brandeis' reference to "the right to be let alone,""' and the
Court's statement in Griswold v. Connecticut that the "First
Amendment has a penumbra where privacy is protected from governmental intrusion."'7
After acknowledging that there existed a privacy right to nondisclosure of information, the Court engaged in a balancing test to
determine whether in fact there had been an invasion. The Court
ultimately decided that the patients' privacy rights had not been
invaded and that the threat of disclosure of private facts was not
sufficiently great to require a remedy. In reaching this conclusion,
the Court noted that an independent investigation of the filing
systems "failed to reveal a single case of invasion of a patient's
privacy.'' '17 Failing to find factual data supporting the petitioners'
fears, the Court declined to accept the assumption that the computerized filing system would be used improperly.'" The Court also

165. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 591.

166. Id. at 599-600.
167. Id. at 598-99 n.23.

168. Id.
169. Id. at 599 n.25 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (Brandeis,
J., dissenting)).
170. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599 n.25 (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
483 (1965)).
171. Id. at 601 n.27.
172. See id. at 601.
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reasoned that the disclosure of personal information to authorized
employees of the New York Department of Health was not significantly different from disclosures made under the prior law, nor
"meaningfully distinguishable from a host of other unpleasant invasions of privacy that are associated with many facets of health
care."' However, in holding that the privacy rights were not
violated, the Court's focus was on the state's regulatory purpose in
overseeing the dissemination of drugs. 4 Absent this clearly justified regulatory purpose, the question remains whether goals or
purposes not related to public health would justify an invasion of
privacy.
While Whalen recognized that there existed a Constitutional
right to privacy concerning the nondisclosure of private facts, it did
not clearly establish the parameters of this right. Unclear from this
decision is whether the Court considers the right fundamental; the
Court does not make a specific statement either way. In citing Roe
v. Wade, the implication is that the Court viewed the right to nondisclosure of private facts to be fundamental since the Court classifies decisions concerning procreation as fundamental.' This implication is bolstered by the fact that the Court does not do a
rational basis test, which would be appropriate if the right were
nonfundamental. Instead, the Court engages in a balancing test,
which is only used in intermediate
or higher level scrutiny cases
176
involving fundamental rights.
The Court's later decision in United States Department of
Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press7' is also evasive as to the level of scrutiny to apply to privacy invasions.
In this case, the Court considered whether a CBS reporter and a
media rights advocacy group could gain access to the FBI rap
sheets of Charles Medico under the FOIA. In deciding not to allow
disclosure of the records, the Court appeared to apply a more stringent standard than it had in Whalen. The Court stated that:
[W]e hold as a categorical matter that a third party's request for law enforcement records or information about a
private citizen can reasonably be expected to invade that

173. Id. at 602.

174. See id. at 600.
175. See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 598-600 nn.23; 26.
176. See id. at 600 (finding that the "New York program does not, on its face, pose a

sufficiently grievous threat" to patient interests).
177. 489 U.S. 749 (1989).
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citizen's privacy, and that when the request seeks no "official information"... but merely records that the Government happens 1 78to be storing, the invasion of privacy is
"unwarranted.
The use of the word "categorical" suggests a more stringent test
than the "balancing" alluded to in Whalen. This more stringent test
can be explained by the presence of the FOIA, which was not a

factor in Whalen. Moreover, Justice Blackmun's concurrence suggests that the Court employed a higher standard; he refused to join
the Court's opinion because he did not like the "Court's bright-line

approach but would leave the door open for the disclosure of rapsheet information in some circumstances."' 79 Justice Brennan
signed on to Justice Blackmun's concurrence, thereby distinguishing
between Whalen (in which Justice Brennan stated that a compelling

state interest may have been required if there had been a broad
dissemination of information") and Reporters Committee (in
which he agreed that a more flexible balancing approach was nec81
essary' ).8
An analysis of lower court decisions reveals that several courts
classify the right to nondisclosure of information as a

nonfundamental right that requires intermediate level scrutiny. The
Third Circuit, noting that "[m]ost circuits appear to apply an 'intermediate standard of review' for the majority of confidentiality

violations,""' applied a medium level of scrutiny to the city of
Philadelphia's release of medical and financial information." 4
Likewise, the Fifth Circuit weighed the "government's interest in
disclosure against the individual's privacy interest,'"" and the

178. Id. at 780.
179. Id. at 781 (Blacknun, J., concurring).
180. See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 606-07.
181. See Reporters Committee, 489 U.S. at 780-81 (Blackmun, J.,concurring).
182. This distinction by Justice Brennan is curious, considering that the dissemination of
information in Reporters Committee was potentially more broad than it was in Whalen. In
Reporters Committee, it was a reporter and an association of journalists who sought to
have private information disclosed. See id. at 757. In Whalen, the information was not
actually disclosed to anyone; the threat of disclosure was only to the State, not to the
media. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 600-01.
183. Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge 5 v. City of Philadelphia, 812 F.2d 105, 110 (3rd
Cir. 1987).
184. See id. at 111; see also Doe v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 72 F.3d 1133,
1139 (3rd Cir. 1995) (applying an intermediate level of scrutiny to disclosure of pharmaceutical drug information to employer of employee suffering from AIDS).
185. National Treasury Employees v. United States Dep't of the Treasury, 25 F.3d 237,
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Second Circuit assessed privacy challenges "under an intermediate
scrutiny, or balancing, analysis.""18
However, not all courts treat the disclosure of private information as a nonfundamental right. The Tenth Circuit, for example,
applies a compelling state interest test for invasions of privacy. In
Mangels v. Pena," the Tenth Circuit considered an invasion of
privacy claim when the Denver Police Department released to the
media a report alleging that two firefighters used drugs.' In analyzing the claim, the court stated that there is "an assurance of
confidentiality with respect to certain forms of personal information
possessed by the state," and that "[d]isclosure of such information
must advance a compelling state interest which ... must be accomplished in the least intrusive manner." '89 Likewise, in Sheets
v. Salt Lake County,9 ' the Tenth Circuit again stated that it
found "no compelling state interest in ... [the] disclosure of the
diary excerpts. 191
Beyond questions of classifying the right and deciding which
level of scrutiny to apply, the Whalen decision is also elusive as to
what types of information are considered sufficiently personal to
trigger the right. The difference in types of information and the
way in which the information is presented may in fact make a
significant difference in the outcome of the case. The decision in
Whalen is factually limited to the consideration of medical records,
as opposed to Reporters Committee, where the issue was the disclosure of FBI rap-sheet information. While the Whalen Court did
not recognize the release of medical information as a sufficient
threat to privacy based on the facts presented, the Reporters Committee Court did consider the release of rap sheet information to be
a substantial intrusion.'"
The Court in Reporters Committee further differentiated between consolidated and unconsolidated information. The Court
specifically noted that information available in public court records

242 (5th Cir. 1994).
186. Igneri v. Moore, 898 F.2d 870, 873 (2nd Cir. 1990).
187. 789 F.2d 836 (10th Cir. 1986).
188. See id. at 837.
189. Id. at 839.
190. 45 F.3d 1383 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 74 (1995).

191. Id. at 1388-89 (involving a husband's privacy interest in the contents of his wife's
diary, which he had turned over to police to aid their investigation).
192. United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. For Freedom of the Press, 489

U.S. 749, 771 (1989) (stating that the "privacy interest in a rap sheet is substantial').
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was significantly different from information available in a rap
sheet, which consolidates a variety of information that may not be
otherwise available. 93 This distinction led one commentator to
conclude that: "What the court found in Reporters Committee is
that there is an expectation of privacy in a computerized, comprehensive record of all of an individual's activities-but not necessarily an expectation of privacy in a single criminal event."' 94 Thus,
the strength of the privacy interest appears to be affected not only
by the type of information but also by the presentation of the
information.
The individual's expectation of privacy is cited by several
courts as being critical to the assessment of the privacy interest.
The Court in Whalen denied relief in part because the individuals
did not have a high privacy expectation since the medical field is
one in which there are continuous and expected invasions of privacy by doctors, insurance agents, and public health officials. 95
Several courts require a showing of an expectation of privacy to
sustain a Constitutional challenge. In Nilson v. Layton City,"9 for
example, the Tenth Circuit required that the "party asserting the
right [have] a legitimate expectation of privacy."'" In order to
establish a legitimate expectation of privacy, the information must
be highly personal or intimate and not readily available to the
public. 9 The Tenth Circuit later clarified this requirement when
it stated that "information need not be embarrassing to be personal
and whether it is sufficiently personal to be protected is ... a
legitimate question for the jury."'
Also important is the question of who is requesting the information and for what purpose. The Court emphasized this point in
Reporters Committee when it based its holding largely on the fact
that a private person sought the information for the purpose of
investigating an individual rather than the state. The Court noted

193. See id. at 764 (noting that "[p]lainly there is a vast difference between the public
records that might be found after a diligent search of courthouse files, county archives,
and local police stations throughout the country and a computerized summary located in a
single clearinghouse of information").
194. Flaherty, supra note 159, at 841.
195. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 602 (1977).
196. 45 F.3d 369 (10th Cir. 1995).
197. Id. at 371.
198. See id. at 372.
199. Sheets v. Salt Lake County, 45 F.3d 1383, 1388 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 74 (1995).
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that the "FOIA's central purpose is to ensure that the Government's
activities be opened to the sharp eye of public scrutiny, not that
information about private citizens that happens to be in the warehouse of the Government be so disclosed."
The Court stated
that disclosing the information would "not shed any light on the
conduct of any Government agency or official. '° Therefore, it
appears to be dispositive in certain situations that there will be a
constitutional invasion of privacy if the information is being disseminated to a private person rather than to the state, and if the
information will not shed light on the government but only on the
individual.
C. Implicationsfor Private Tax Collection
The constitutional right to nondisclosure of private facts has
implications for the privatization of tax collection. The existence of
the right raises questions as to whether disseminating information
to private tax collectors is an infringement on the individual's right
to prevent disclosure of personal financial information. The following analysis illustrates that the IRS' plan to disseminate financial
information to private tax collectors violates the constitutional right
to privacy.
1. Personal Information
The first question that must be addressed in considering the
private tax collection scheme is whether financial information is
sufficiently personal to raise a constitutional privacy challenge. In
Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, the Supreme Court
recognized that President Nixon had a "legitimate expectation of
privacy" in "matters concerned with family or personal finances. '' "e3 Although the Court ultimately denied Nixon's privacy
challenge,
the Court acknowledged the President's legitimate
200. United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. For Freedom of the Press, 489
U.S. 749, 774 (1989).
201. Id.at 773.
202. 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
203. Id. at 457-58.
204. The court made the following observation about President Nixon's privacy interests
in protecting the tapes and documents collected during his presidency.
In sum, appellant has a legitimate expectation of privacy in his personal communications. But the constitutionality of the Act must be viewed in the context
of the limited intrusion of the screening process, of appellant's status as a
public figure, of his lack of any expectation of privacy in the overwhelming
majority of the materials, of the important public interest in preservation of the
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privacy expectation for personal and financial information because
of the "pattern of de facto Presidential control and congressional
acquiescence" over such matters.' While the Nixon case raised
unique questions because it involved separation of powers issues
intertwined with privacy issues, the Court's statement that Nixon

had a legitimate expectation of privacy was based on the subject
matter of the disclosure (family and personal finances), not on his
relationship with Congress. Moreover, several circuits that have
considered the issue without the separation of powers concerns

have held that financial information is personal in nature and requires constitutional protection.'
Not all circuits, however, have reached this conclusion. In
O'Brien v. DiGrazia,' the First Circuit refused to grant privacy
protection to financial information. 2 In this case, police officers

were suspended for failing to complete a financial questionnaire;
they then brought a civil rights action against the police commissioner. The court held that the commissioner had not invaded the
officers' privacy because "[p]rivacy in the sense of freedom to

withhold personal financial information from the government or the
materials, and of the virtual impossibility of segregating the small quantity of
private materials without comprehensive screening.
Id. at 465.
205. Id at 458.
206. See id. at 457-58 (noting the "constitutionally protected privacy rights in matters of
personal life unrelated to any acts done ... in their public capacity").
207. In Barry v. City of New York, the Second Circuit stated that "public disclosure of
financial information may be personally embarrassing and highly intrusive." 712 F.2d
1554, 1561 (2d Cir. 1983) (considering whether the city's financial disclosure law was an
invasion of privacy). Although the court ultimately decided that there had not been an
invasion of privacy because there were sufficient safeguards to protect against an invasion,
it did recognize that the plaintiffs had a legitimate interest in protecting such information.
See id. The Third Circuit agreed in Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 5 v. City of
Philadelphia that financial information is entitled to privacy protection, despite the fact
that it is less intimate than medical information. Although the court ultimately decided
that there had not been an invasion of privacy because there were sufficient safeguards to
protect against an invasion, it did recognize that the plaintiffs had a legitimate interest in
protecting such information. See Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 5 v. City of Philadelphia, 812 F.2d 105, 115 (3rd Cir. 1987). Similarly, the Fifth Circuit recognized that
individuals have a legitimate expectation of privacy concerning financial matters because
money concerns are an "essential element of... peace of mind." Plante v. Gonzalez,
575 F.2d 1119, 1130 (5th Cir. 1978) (quoting City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Young, 466
P.2d 225, 231-32 (Cal. 1970)). The Plante court also noted that financial privacy is a
substantial interest because of "the threat of kidnapping, the irritation of solicitations, [and]
the embarrassment of poverty." Id. at 1135.
208. 544 F.2d 543 (1st Cir. 1976).
209. See id. at 545-46.
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public has received little constitutional protection."2 0" The First
Circuit's rationale, in O'Brien, for denying protection for financial
information can be distinguished because there was no threat of
disclosure; the police officers did not claim that the commissioner
would disclose their finances to the public or government agencies.21
Because the Supreme Court and the majority of federal circuits
recognize that financial information is sufficiently personal to raise
privacy concerns, and because the O'Brien case can be distinguished on its facts, it is likely that tax information will achieve
constitutional protection. Releasing information concerning past-due
taxes is clearly a personal, financial matter since it discloses not
only that taxes are past due but also allows parties to assess the
individuals' net income and tax bracket. Moreover, it is not merely
financial information that will be disclosed to private tax collectors;
the bill, as it currently stands, will also allow the IRS to disclose
social security numbers." 2
2. Type of Information Requests
The second question that the private tax collection bill raises is
whether the purpose and direction of disclosure are valid. As discussed in Reporters Committee, the Court is less willing to allow a
disclosure of private financial information when the person seeking
the information uses it to assess the financial records of an individual rather than to assess the workings of the agency generally.2 3
This purpose analysis is not particularly applicable to private tax
collection because, although private tax collectors are acquiring
information about specific individuals, they are not seeking or
requesting the information for their own purposes. Rather they are
given private financial information in order to collect money for
the government. Thus, there is little concern for an illegal purpose.
On the other hand, the Court in Reporters Committee also
alluded to the fact that it is less willing to allow disclosure when a
private individual rather than a government employee or agency
requests the information.214 Likewise, several courts have held

210. Id. at 545-46.
211. See id. at 546.
212. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
213. See United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. For Freedom of the Press,
489 U.S. 749, 774 (1989).
214. See id. at 765.
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that companies hired by the government are in fact independent
contractors and not agents of the government. 215 This factor obviously raises questions about the role of the private tax collectors
and whether they are classified as private or public actors. Under
the constitutional privacy analysis (as opposed to the tort privacy
analysis discussed in the following Part of this Note2 16), disclosure of private financial information to a private individual is more
likely to transgress constitutional privacy protection. Therefore,
disclosure to private tax collectors could conceivably be a violation
of individuals' privacy rights merely because the tax collectors are
private actors. And yet, as the qualified immunity discussion under
the torts analysis illustrates,2 7 it is possible to argue that private
tax collectors are state actors. If private tax collectors are indeed
state actors, then the likelihood of constitutional violations of privacy are lessened. In an attempt to underscore the potential problems
associated with the current tax collection proposal, this section will
assume that the collection agency is a private and not a state actor.
3. Expectation of Privacy
The third preliminary question that must be answered before
engaging in a balancing test concerns expectations; whether the
individual taxpayer has a constitutionally-based expectation of privacy for financial and tax return information. This question is
answered in the affirmative based on a complicated web of administrative, historical, and legal factors. The most obvious factor
contributing to the taxpayers' expectation of privacy is that the
current administrative system for collecting federal taxes does not
include private tax collectors. In other words, taxpayers are accustomed to a system of tax collection in which government officials
review their financial information and private parties, generally, do
not have access to it. The tax situation is different from the medical environment where numerous outside individuals must have
private information in order to treat patients, pay for services, and
gather data about diseases and medical conditions. In the case of
tax collection, the only people who must know about the
taxpayer's financial situation are the individual taxpayer and the

215. See infra Part V.D.1.
216. See infra Part V.
217. See infra part V.D.
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government. Administrative custom and history have therefore
created a privacy expectation. 18
Another factor contributing to the taxpayers' expectations of
privacy is the growing trend in statutory and tort law to broaden
the protected area of privacy rights. As discussed earlier, the Privacy Act of 1974 and the exceptions to the FOIA provide taxpayers
with clear privacy rights concerning their personal tax information.219 These statutory rights create expectations for individuals.
The Supreme Court used the expansion of statutory protections
rationale in Reporters Committee to support its finding that disclosure of FBI rap-sheets was unconstitutional. The Court reasoned
that an expectation of privacy was "supported by the web of federal statutory and regulatory provisions that limits the disclosure of
rap-sheet information," and then proceeded to summarize several
federal regulations and statutes that limited the disclosure of rapsheet information.' The Court also pointed to portions of the
FOIA and the Privacy Act to illustrate the "level of federal con'
cern over centralized data bases. '""I
Based on the Court's use of
this reasoning in Reporters Committee, it is arguable that taxpayers
have an expectation of privacy based on existing statutory law.
Developments in tort law also encourage an expectation of
privacy for taxpayers.' As courts recognize an invasion of privacy cause of action for breaches of informational privacy, the indirect effect is to create an expectation of constitutional protection.
The Tenth Circuit made a cursory mention of this relationship in
Sheets when it commented in a footnote that "[tihough the common law tort of invasion of privacy does not control the federal
constitutional claim, we find that the tort ... provides some guidance as to what constitutes a reasonable expectation of priva'
cy. 2M3
Therefore, the expectation of privacy is strengthened as
218. The flip-side of this rationale was used by the Third Circuit when it stated that

"[w]hen employees are aware that disclosure of otherwise confidential information has
historically been required by those in similar positions, their expectation of privacy in that
type of information is reduced." Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 5 v. City of Philadelphia, 812 F.2d 105, 114 (citing Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136, 1142 (3rd Cir.
1986) (upholding random drug testing of jockeys because of a reduced expectation of
privacy due to the racing commission's past conduct)).
219. See supra Part II.B.
220. United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489
U.S. 749, 764-65 (1989).
221. Id. at 767.
222. See generally infra Part V (discussing the history of the privacy tort and concluding that taxpayers have an expectation of privacy).
223. Sheets v. Salt Lake County, 45 F.3d 1383, 1388 n.1 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied,
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both tort and statutory law expands, which in turn expands the
constitutional protections to taxpayers.
4. Level of Scrutiny
Having established that financial information is sufficiently
personal to be constitutionally protected, that taxpayers have expectations of privacy, and that disclosing information to private tax
collectors is problematic because they are private parties, the question remains whether disclosing information actually constitutes a
violation of the privacy right. In order to determine the answer to
this question, it is necessary to apply either a strict scrutiny test or
an intermediate level scrutiny test. However, if the government's
interests fail under an intermediate level test, they necessarily fail
under a strict scrutiny test. Therefore, the following analysis considers only the intermediate level scrutiny test, and illustrates that
individuals rights triumph.
When engaging in an intermediate level of scrutiny, the balance
rests between the governmental interest in the reasons for disclosing the information and the individual interests in protecting the
information. Factored into the government's side of the analysis are
the procedural safeguards that the government has implemented to
prevent disclosure, whether the means employed by the government
are reasonable, and a comparison to the existing system for controlling the information. For example, in Whalen, the Court held
that the state's regulatory purpose of overseeing the dissemination
of drugs outweighed the possible invasion of privacy.' In the
tax collection situation, on the other hand, the state does not have
a similarly persuasive purpose. Ostensibly, the only purpose that
the state has for disseminating tax information is for efficiency
concerns; that is, the state thinks that privatization would increase
revenues or decrease expenditures. It will be hard for the state to
argue that the efficiency concerns should outweigh privacy interests
because, as was argued in Whalen, efficiency is not as strong a
concern as public safety.
As the proposal currently stands, it does not establish safeguards that would prevent disclosure of information to unauthorized
individuals. The proposal does not include provisions ensuring that

116 S. CL 74 (1995).
224. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 171-74 and accompanying text.
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the private agents cannot gain more than the necessary information,
or provisions that would protect against public disclosure. While
the means are reasonable (and the courts will not inquire into the
truth of the efficiency arguments because that is essentially a political or legislative question), the comparison to the existing system
for controlling information will probably weigh in favor of the
individual right. In other words, if the court compares the proposal
to the existing tax collection system, they will find that the existing system is sufficient to achieve the desired end. Moreover, the
potential for abuse under the private system is too great to warrant
change. In light of the individual's expectation of privacy, the right
to nondisclosure of private facts, whether classified as a fundamental or nonfundamental right, outweighs the state's interests under
either a strict scrutiny or an intermediate level test.
V.

PRIVACY TORT

A. Background

Like the constitutional right to privacy, which is embroiled in
debate concerning its scope and existence,' the right to privacy
under tort law is similarly attacked and questioned.' In part, this
debate is a result of the relatively recent origin of the tort; no English or American court expressly granted relief based on privacy
before 1890.' Recognition of a privacy tort law emerged only

226. See supra notes 153-63 and accompanying text.
227. See Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy, Tort Law and the Constitution: Is Warren and
Brandeis' Tort Petty and Unconstitutional as Well?, 46 TEX. L. REV. 611, 628-29 (1968)
(defending Warren and Brandeis's privacy tort because the "Meikeljohn theory permits the
mass publication tort to be applied consistently with the mandate of the first amendment"); Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law--Were Warren And Brandeis Wrong?, 31

LAW & CONTEMP. PROBES. 326, 333 (1966) (arguing that the privacy tort "has no legal
profile"); Mary Ann L. Wymore, Modernizing the Law of Privacy, 40 FED. B. NEWS & J.
374 (1993) (challenging the validity of the intrusion tort and arguing for its elimination);
Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis's

Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REv. 291, 294 (1983) (arguing that the "elegant vessel that
Warren and Brandeis set afloat some nine decades ago is in fact a leaky ship which
should at long last be scuttled'); Russell D. Workman, Balancing the Right to Privacy
and the First Amendment, 29 HOUS. L. REV. 1059 (1992) (arguing that a proper balanc-

ing of inteiests requires the Court to reach a different result in privacy torts than it has
traditionally recognized).
228. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 117,
at 849 (5th ed. 1984); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A cmt. a (1989) (noting
that prior to 1890 no court expressly recognized the privacy tort, but that "there were
decisions that in retrospect appear to have protected it in one manner or another").
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after publication of the Warren and Brandeis article in 1890.' 9
Despite the encouragement of Warren and Brandeis, many courts
were initially reluctant to recognize the new privacy tort," and
those courts that chose to recognize the tort did not agree on the

scope or elements of the right.L'
In 1960, Dean Prosser addressed the confusion among the
courts by analyzing the cases falling under the broad rubric of
privacy.1 2 He categorized the privacy cases into four sub-groups:

(1) intrusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion or private affairs; 3 (2)
public disclosure of private facts;"s4 (3) publicity that sheds a
false light on the plaintiff; 5 and (4) appropriation of the
plaintiff's name or likeness for another's benefit.' The Restatement of Torts adopted this classification in 1981.' The result of

the Restatement's adoption is that the majority of jurisdictions now
recognize a right to privacy, but not necessarily all four categories
of the tort. t

229. The first case recognizing the privacy tort was Pavesich v. New England Life Ins.
Co., 50 S.E. 68, 80 (Ga. 1905). In Pavesich, the court argued that
The knowledge that one's features and form are being used ... and, as long
as the advertiser uses him for these purposes, he cannot be otherwise than
conscious of the fact that he is for the time being under the control of another,
that he is no longer free, and that he is in reality a slave, without hope of
freedom, held to service by a merciless master.
Id. at 80.
230. See Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902) (denying
relief to a woman whose picture was used to advertise flour because of the lack of precedent to support an invasion of privacy claim).
231. See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REv. 383, 389 (1960). Prosser states
that:
What has emerged from the decisions is no simple matter. It is not one tort,
but . . . four. The law of privacy . . . [cases] are tied together by the common name, but otherwise have almost nothing in common except that each
represents an interference with the right of the plaintiff. .. "to be let alone."
Id.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id. at 383.
id. at 389-92.
id. at 392-98.
id. at 398-401.
Prosser, supra note 231, at 401-07.
RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF TORT §§ 652B, C, D, E (1989).
§§ 652B, C, D, E.
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B. Public Disclosure of Private Facts

Public disclosure of private facts is generally thought to include
three elements: (1) the disclosure must be public; (2) the facts
disclosed must be private; and (3) the disclosure must offend the
reasonable person." 9 However, the Second Restatement of Torts
includes a fourth element requiring that the public not have a legitimate interest in having the facts made available.2
. Much of the confusion surrounding the public disclosure of
private facts results from definitional uncertainty.2 4 Courts differ
as to what constitutes a public disclosure and whether public disclosure is actually necessary 2 42 Public disclosure may or may not
require a large audience; disclosure of private information to individuals or small groups may constitute an invasion of privacy in
certain situations. In Beaumont v. Brown, the court stated that
disclosure of information to a neighbor could constitute a breach of
privacy.243 And yet, disclosure of information to the news media
or other large audience may not constitute a public disclosure,
especially if the information is part of the public record.2'
Courts differ as to the nature of the facts that must be disclosed to constitute a breach; all agree, however, that the disclosure
must offend a reasonable person. One group of cases addresses the
public disclosure of private, life-style facts. In Melvin v. Reid, the
plaintiff sued for the public disclosure that she had previously been
a prostitute.245 The court granted relief because the ordinary, reasonable person would not want such information disclosed. 24

239. See Prosser, supra note 231, at 393-96; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
(1989).
240. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D & cmt. d (1989).

TORTS

§ 652D

241. See LIBEL DEFENSE RESOURCE CENTER, 50 STATE SURVEY 1994-95: CURRENT

833-36 (Henry R.
Kaufman ed., 1994) (reporting that 34 jurisdictions adopted the private-facts tort);
DEVELOPMENTS IN MEDIA LIBEL AND INVASION OF PRIVACY LAW

Zimmerman, supra note 227, at 365 (reporting that 36 jurisdictions recognize the private-

facts tort).
242. See Santiesteban v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 306 F.2d 9 (5th Cir. 1962);
Schwartz v. Thiele, 51 Cal. Rptr. 767 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1966); French v. Safeway
Stores, Inc., 430 P.2d 1021 (Or. 1967).
243. 257 N.W.2d 522, 531 (Mich. 1977).
244. See Prosser, supra note 231, at 396 (stating that "the existence of a public record
is a factor of a good deal of importance, which will normally prevent the matter from
being private").
245. 297 P. 91 (Cal. Dist. CL App. 1931).
246. See id. at 93 (stating that defendant's conduct "was not justified by any standard
of morals or ethics known to us").
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Another group of cases considers disclosure of factual information that is not necessarily related to one's lifestyle but has more
to do with one's medical or financial condition. 7 This second
category has less to do with events or happenings in one's life,
and more to do with data, statistics, and numbers. The privacy
issues surrounding such facts are frequently grouped under the
generic term of "informational privacy." Alan Westin defines informational privacy broadly as the "claim of individuals ... to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information
'2
about them is communicated to others. 4
An important feature of informational privacy is that the issues
inherent in the tort become more acute with technological advancement. After all, "[p]rivate data banks have mushroomed over the
past few decades, generating a spate of dire predictions ... [because] [o]n average, they trade information on every man, woman
and child five times per day."249 Technological advancement allows more information to be amassed and traded more frequently,
thereby increasing the power of those who control the databanks
° As the
and decreasing individual power and control O
power dynamics change, so too does the potential for recovery under a
privacy tort; the more information that a company has about an
individual, the greater the potential for disclosure of private facts
that would offend the reasonable person.

247. See, e.g., Brents v. Morgan, 297 S.W. 967, 968 (Ky. 1927) (holding a creditor

liable for an invasion of privacy after it placed a five foot by eight foot sign in its window that stated: "Dr. W. R. Morgan owes an account here of $49.67.").
248. ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967).
249. See Steven A. Bibas, A Contractual Approach to Data Privacy, 17 HARV. J. L. &
PUB. POL'Y 591, 593 (1994) (citing DAviD BuRNHAM, THE RISE OF THE COMPUTER
STATE 243 (1988)).
250. See generally Frederick Schauer, Reflections on the Value of Truth, 41 CASE W.
RES. L. REv. 699 (1991). Professor Shauer makes this point when he argues that "we
should examine privacy law by looking at the class of individuals or institutions empowered by an increase in information brought by a relaxation of the current standard and at
whose expense this occurs." Id. at 718.
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C. Information Privacy under the IRS

While many commentators are concerned about the ramifications of private databanks on privacy protection,"s additional issues arise when the information collector is the government. One
of the major differences between public collectors and private
collectors is the amount of information involved: the government
has access to private databanks as well as to huge amounts of
information collected by government agencies and departments. The
result is that a privacy breach by the government is potentially
greater than a breach by a private company.
A second difference between public and private collectors of
information is that the government is caught in a paradox with
which the private companies do not have to contend. The paradox
is that the government is "a logical source of protection from violations of personal privacy, [but] is probably the greatest information collector and does not always vigilantly protect personal privacy. 1" 2 Thus, the government becomes both "collector" and "protector."' sa This tension leads to the question of which interest the
government favors; in the case of tax collection, the "collector"
interest will more than likely outweigh the "protector" interest
since the government must have revenues to operate before it can
regulate.
Third, there is a difference in how the information is gathered.
In the private context, most of the information is gathered through
other vendors. That is, the individual does not consent to the com-

251. See Francis S. Chlapowski, Note, The Constitutional Protection of Informational
Privacy, 71 B.U. L. REV. 133, 134 (1991) (stating that "individuals need protection from
the government itself, from both unnecessary collection of personal information and from
illegitimate disclosure of this information"); Harold J. Krent, Of Diaries and Data Banks:
Use Restrictions Under the Fourth Amendment, 74 TEX. L. REV. 49 (1995) (addressing
the issue of whether government authorities should be able to disseminate information
they obtain in legal searches and seizures of databanks); Sandra Byrd Peterson, Your Life
as an Open Book. Has Technology Rendered Personal Privacy Virtually Obsolete?, 48
FED. COMM. LJ. 163, 164 (1995) (arguing that privacy tort law has not kept pace with
technology); Judith Beth Prowda, Privacy and Security of Data, 64 FoRDHAM L. REV.
738, 743 (1995) (stating that existing laws need to be changed in order to ensure privacy
in an electronic environment); Jonathan P. Graham, Privacy, Computers, and the Commercial Dissemination of PersonalInformation, 65 Tax. L. REV. 1395, 1397 (1987) (arguing
that the legal right to privacy must protect the "individual's interest in maintaining autonomy and society's interest in fostering productive human relations in the face of the en-

croachments threatened by the information age").
252. Chlapowski, supra note 251, at 133-34 (citations omitted).
253. See id.
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panies having the information. In stark contrast to the private companies, the government collects information through voluntary disclosure. The information that individuals disclose in their tax returns is given voluntarily and with the assurance that the information will remain confidential. Private companies rarely agree to
keep their information confidential. 4 This difference suggests
that privacy expectations of an individual are greater when dealing
with the government than with a private company.
The fourth and perhaps the most significant difference between
public and private information collectors concerns the potential
liability of the parties. While the doctrine of sovereign immunity
usually protects the government from citizens' tort claims under
common law, the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") acts as a
partial waiver of the sovereign immunity doctrine.25 Under the
FTCA, individuals can recover damages for torts committed by
government agents, officials, or employees acting within the scope
of their employment,V6 so long as the injured party brings an action against the government rather than against the individual, and
the tort claim is based on state law.
However, the FTCA does not cover most breaches by IRS
employees because of two notable exceptions to the sovereign
immunity waiver." First, the discretionary exception clause retains sovereign immunity for any claim "based upon the exercise
or performance or the failure to perform a discretionary function or
duty on the part of the federal agency or an employee of the Gov-

254. See Bibas, supra note 249, at 593 ("[Clonsumer credit bureaus hold 400 million
credit files and make possible 1.5 million credit decisions each day.").
255. See James T. Towe, Is the IRS Above the Law? Potential Remedies for Taxpayers
Damaged by Unlawful IRS Conduct, 55 MONT. L. REV. 469, 470 (1994).

256. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1994).
257.- It should be noted that the protection from tort liability does not preclude criminal
charges being brought against an IRS agent. In United States v. Richey, the Ninth Circuit
held that an IRS agent who disclosed confidential tax information was not protected from
prosecution. 924 F.2d 857, 862 (9th Cir. 1991). The IRS agent was indicted for his involvement in a tax shelter scheme and was convicted of conspiracy and aiding in the
preparation of false tax returns. See id. at 858. After sentencing, Richey accused the presiding judge of being malicious and disclosed that he had interviewed the judge and assessed additional taxes fifteen years prior. See id. at 858, 864. Because of these statements, Richey was convicted of three felony counts of unauthorized disclosure of tax
return information in violation of I.R.C. § 7213. See id. at 864. On appeal, the court
affirmed Richey's conviction and denied that his speech required first amendment protection. See id. Richey had argued that his disclosure was entitled to first amendment protection because there was a significant public interest in having the information disclosed.
See id. at 860.
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ernment, whether or not the discretion involved... abuse[]." '
In interpreting this clause, the Supreme Court defined a "discretionary act" broadly. In turn, the IRS has relied on this broad interpretation to argue that it is exempted from the FTCA for a wide
range of "discretionary activities. ' 9
The IRS' arguments based on the discretionary exception are
not always successful. In Johnson v. Sawyer,' ° the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit refused to accept the government's reliance on the discretionary exception. Johnson sued the IRS under
the FTCA, alleging that the IRS made an unauthorized disclosure
of confidential tax information in a press release. The release stated
that: "Johnson, an executive vice president for the American National Insurance Corporation, was charged in a criminal ... [case]
with claiming false business deductions and altering documents
involving his 1974 and 1975 tax returns. 'a' In considering this
disclosure of tax return information, the court reasoned that there
was a limit to the discretionary function exception and that the
exception did "not encompass every act of a government employee
that involves some element of discretion."a' 2 As a result, the
court stated that the "sheltering wings of the exception are broad,
but not infinite," and refused to allow the IRS' disclosure to fall
within the discretionary exception category.'
The FTCA also includes an exception for tax assessment and
collection. The exception bars any claims relating to the assessment
or collection of any tax. Recognizing the government's interests,
"[s]everal courts have broadly interpreted the tax exception to
insulate the United States from tort liability."
For example, in
Morris v. United States,. the plaintiff sued when the IRS incorrectly informed Morris's creditors that he would become insolvent
due to tax liability. The circuit court affirmed the lower court's

258. Towe, supra note 255, at 476 (citation omitted).
259. See, e.g., United States v. Gaurbert, 499 U.S. 315, 325 (1991).
260. 980 F.2d 1490 (5th Cir. 1992), rev'd en banc, 47 F.3d 716 (5th Cir. 1995). Even

though Johnson was later reversed, the case still stands for the proposition that the IRS'
arguments are not always successful and that the discretionary exception argument may
not always work.
261. Id.at 1493 n.7.
262. Id. at 1502.
263. Id. at 1503. Although this case was later reversed, the court did not address this

particular issue.
264. Towe, supra note 255, at 479.
265. 521 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1975).
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dismissal, stating that the tax exception within the FTCA denied
the court subject matter jurisdiction to hear the claim.'
On the other hand, in Johnson the Court of Appeals refused to
accept that the tax exception extended to all acts by IRS agents.
The court stated that:
A determination that the ambit of the assessment and collection exception is so all-embracing as to cover the news
releases about Johnson's conviction would extend the exception to the point that the FTCA's waiver of sovereign
immunity vis-a-vis the IRS would be wholly subsumed in
that exception. Such an extension would effectively exempt
every act of every IRS agent whatsoever. No case law
cited to this court supports such a pervasive immunity for
the IRS, and we have found none independently ....
[I]n
the instant case, accepting the government's argument
would stretch the assessment and collection exception to
cover all general deterrent activities of the IRS even
though, as here, the taxpayer may have long since paid the
tax deficiency as well as penalties and interest.'
As this quote suggests, taxpayers may be able to recover for invasions of privacy under the FTCA despite the tax exception clause.
Notwithstanding the court's argument in Johnson, it is highly
unlikely that taxpayers' privacy tort claims against the IRS will be
successful. This is because the exceptions clause covers a large
range of possible invasions. To be successful, the plaintiff must
establish that the IRS agent acted in bad faith, and the FTCA
requires that the tort be based on state law.' In fact, Johnson's
claims against the IRS were ultimately not successful because the
Court of Appeals determined that his claims were not based on
state Ilaw.
m 9
D. Implicationsfor Private Tax Collectors
While the above analysis illustrates that the IRS is largely
protected from privacy torts due to the doctrine of sovereign immunity and FTCA exceptions, this protection does not necessarily
extend to private tax collectors. The following analysis illustrates

266.
267.
268.
269.

See id. at 874.
Johnson, 980 F.2d at 1503-04.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1994).
See § 1346(b).
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that it is unlikely that
nity from tort liability
under the doctrine of
sons immunity should

private tax collectors will be granted immuunder the exceptions clauses of the FTCA or
qualified immunity, and that for policy reanot be extended.

1. Defining Government Employee
The FTCA's protection of the IRS against privacy torts may
not extend to private tax collectors' actions because it is not clear
that private collectors are government employees. The distinction
between government and non-government employees is critical: if
private tax collectors are government employees and fall within the
scope of the FTCA, neither private companies nor the government
can be liable for privacy invasions."7 Under the FrCA, individuals cannot be held liable-only the federal government can be held
liable. 2 t As a result, if private tax collectors are deemed federal
government employees, then the liability rests with the government
so long as one of the exceptions does not apply. However, because
the private companies are protected from liability under the exceptions clause and the discretionary clause, the government is not
liable for the torts of the private tax collectors either. On the other
hand, if courts determine that private tax collectors are not government agents, then collectors are liable as private parties.
A review of the statute and the case law interpreting the scope
of the statute establishes that private tax collectors do not fall
within the statute's definition of government employee. The FTCA
states that individuals can recover damages for torts committed by
government agents, officials, or employees acting within the scope
of their employment. m In defining "employee," the statute excludes independent contractors. 3 Likewise, the case law acknowledges that the statute's definition of employee was intended to
have a broad interpretation, 4 but does not extend the scope of
the FTCA to independent contractors.'
In Flynn v. United

270. See § 1346 (describing the liability of the United States as a defendant).
271. See § 1346.
272. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1994).
273. See 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1994).
274. See Witt v. United States, 462 F.2d 1261, 1263 (2nd Cir. 1972).
275. See United States v. Page, 350 F.2d 28, 34 (10th Cir. 1965) (stating that the United States is not liable for injuries caused by independent contractors); see also Rowell v.
United States, No. 89 Civ. 8418, 1992 WL 315653 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 1992) (holding
that the Government cannot be liable for the acts of an independent contractor).
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States, T6 for example, an employee of an independent contractor
brought suit against the United States under the FTCA.m The
court refused to find the United States liable because the United
States did not control any of the details of the performance. 8
The court stated that in order to be held liable, the "United States
must have retained some degree of control over the manner in
which the work is to be done," and that a general right to inspect
was not enoughY9 Because private collectors are independent
contractors, they will not fall within the FTCA's scope.
The only means by which private collectors can be included
within the FTCA's definition of employee is if the government
retains a degree of control over the collectors' activities. As the
proposal currently stands, there appears to be very little supervision
or control by the IRS. The bill does not specify how the collections should proceed, and does not provide for close supervision by
the IRS. Given this lack of control and supervision the federal
government will not be liable, but the private tax collectors will be
liable as private parties. If the IRS or Congress promulgates standards establishing exactly how the collections must proceed, then it
is possible that the private tax collectors will be deemed federal
government employees and neither the federal government nor
private tax collectors will be held liable for privacy breaches.
2. Defining State Action and Qualified Immunity
Beyond FTCA classifications is the question of whether private
tax collectors' activities constitute state action. This question is
important because if their activities are deemed state actions, then
it is possible (but not necessary) that they will enjoy governmental
immunity from citizens' suits. In determining the scope of state
action, the courts have not been consistent in the tests they apply."s Essentially three tests have emerged for determining state
276. 631 F.2d 678 (10th Cir. 1980).
277. See id. at 679.
278. See id. at 682.
279. Id,at 680.
280. See Charles W. Thomas, Resolving the Problem of Qualified Immunity for Private
Defendants in Section 1983 and Bivens Damage Suits, 53 LA. L. REv. 449, 472 (1992)
(discussing the transformation of private parties into state actors). Thomas notes that the
state action requirement is necessary under the Fourteenth Amendment, but that the "color
of law" requirement is needed under 1983 Bivens actions. The "color of law" requirement
does not automatically transfer private parties' actions into state action. See id.
281. See Daphne Barak-Erez, A State Action Doctrine for an Age of Privatization, 45
SYRACUSE L. REv. 1169, 1173-83 (1995) (outlining five methods courts use to extend the
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action: (1) focusing on the government's authorization;"

2

(2) con-

3
sidering the relationship between the private and public entities;1
and (3) assessing the functions and purposes being served. 4
The government authorization test is probably the least likely
to establish state action by private tax collectors. In Public Utilities
Commission v. Pollak,' the Supreme Court held that when a
government entity investigates and explicitly authorizes private
action, such explicit authorization "amounts to sufficient Federal
Government action to make the First and Fifth Amendments applicable thereto.""ass Because an implicit authorization is not sufficient, an explicit authorization is the only means by which to extend immunity 7 Therefore, a private collection company could
not be protected from a privacy tort under an assumption of implied authorization of disclosure of private tax information. Instead,
the IRS would have to promulgate a general ruling specifically
allowing disclosure, or would have to authorize disclosure in particular cases. Not only is it extremely unlikely that the IRS would
promulgate a general rule given the existence of the non-disclosure
rule of § 6103, it is also highly unlikely that the IRS would give

specific authorization for an unlawful disclosure in a particular

state action doctrine: (1) coercion and authorization; (2) subsidies; (3) public function
theory (state passivity); (4) nexus theory (licensing and regulation); (5) nexus theory (financial support and financial dependency)).
282. See Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 462 (1952) (recognizing that
the Public Utilities Commission of the District of Columbia explicitly authorized a radio
program to continue when it "ordered an investigation of it and, after formal public hearings, ordered its investigation dismissed on the ground that the public safety, comfort and
convenience were not impaired"); American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S.
382, 401 (1949) (stating that "power is never without responsibility. . .. [and] when
authority derives in part from Government's thumb on the scales, the exercise of that
power by private persons becomes closely akin, in some respects, to its exercise by Government itself").
283. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961) (holding that
the "State has so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence . . . that it must
be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity . . . [that] cannot be considered to have been so 'purely private' as to fall without the scope of the Fourteenth
Amendment").
284. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352-53 (1974) (stating that
the Court has "found state action present in the exercise by a private entity of powers
traditionally exclusively reserved to the state," and where "some power delegated to it by
the State . . . is traditionally associated with sovereignty").
285. 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
286. Id. at 462-63.
287. See Barak-Erez, supra note 281, at 1174.
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case. Given that an explicit authorization would not occur, the state
action doctrine would not apply to private tax collectors.
Under the second test, the court determines whether the relationship between the public and private entities is "so substantial
that the separation of the two is inappropriate." 8 For example, in
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority 9 the Court held that a
coffee shop that refused to serve the Appellant was not acting in a
purely private capacity, but that the act was instead a discriminatory state action that violated the equal protection clause and the
fourteenth amendment.2' In reaching this conclusion, the Court
looked to the fact that the building and land were publicly
owned,2"9' and that the benefits of the relationship were shared by
the coffee shop and the government.'
The likelihood of establishing state action for private tax collectors under the substantial relationship test is slight. This is because the government is not establishing or incorporating new
companies to provide a new service; rather the government is
hiring existing corporations and law firms that are more than likely
established, independent companies with a long history of debtcollection for non-governmental bodies. Moreover, the private company would probably be located on private land and employ private non-government officials, and therefore the symbiotic relationship recognized in Burton would not exist.293
The third test provides the greatest opportunity for extending
state action to private tax collectors. Under the functional test, the
court considers the function and purpose of the delegation of power.294 If the function and purpose are sufficiently governmental,
then immunity is granted.295 Tax collection is obviously an inherently governmental function: no one but the government collects
taxes. Tax collection also serves an inherently governmental purpose that establishes a basis for the government's sovereignty: the
only reason for collecting taxes is to enable the government to
function.2' Therefore, under the functionality test, there is a high

288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.

Id.
365 U.S. 715 (1961).
See id. at 717.
See id. at 723.
See id.at 724 (stating that the benefits were "mutually conferred").
See id.
See Barak-Erez, supra note 281, at 1175.
See supra note 280 and accompanying text.
One counter-argument is that the activity can be defined as merely "debt collec-
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probability that courts will determine that private tax collectors are
acting under the guise of state action.
While the majority of the courts analyzing the scope of state
action consider one of the three tests outlined above, state action
does not necessarily establish governmental immunity. State action
is merely a means of determining who is responsible for the alleged wrong; immunity on the other hand determines whether the
party will be held responsible. However, qualified immunity extends the doctrine of sovereign immunity to persons or agents who
perform government functions. 29 At times the tests for establishing state action can be the same as those allowing for qualified
immunity because "[tihe Supreme Court has taken a 'functional'

rather than a 'derivative' approach to

immunities."29'

When both

doctrines use a functional analysis of the defendant's actions, then
state action will be protected by qualified immunity. When the
state action doctrine uses a test other than the functional one, there
is less assurance that the state action will be found or that the
action will be immune from suit.
Usually the qualified immunity doctrine is asserted when deciding whether an individual can claim an infringement of a constitutional right,29 but it is also applicable to tort law. As one commentator states, "[D]ecisions by the Supreme Court during the past
quarter of a century have authorized a diverse set of local, state
and federal officials to assert qualified immunity from liability for
monetary damages where the constitutional right [was] violated."' In allowing a spectrum of qualified immunity defenses, the
courts have not established a clear demarcation of the limits to
immunity in either constitutional or torts cases?'
In part the uncertainty is a result of the courts' confusion in
dealing with public-private sector relationships not previously encountered. The new relationships render much of the common law
analysis obsolete; therefore, those courts that employ a strict com-

tion" and not "tax collection."
297. See Thomas, supra note 280, at 483 (noting that "it is settled law that access to
qualified immunity is linked to the function a defendant fulfills rather than the position he
or she holds") (emphasis omitted).
298. Folsom Inv. Co. v. Moore, 681 F.2d 1032, 1037 (5th Cir. 1982).
299. See Thomas, supra note 280, at 451.
300. Id. at 450-51.

301. See id. at 461. The author notes that "[e]fforts by commentators and courts to
define the nature and scope of immunity as it pertains to constitutional torts have confronted a host of problems from the very beginning." Id. at 462.
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mon law analysis will not find any historical basis for extending
qualified immunity to private parties?'
In Duncan v. Peck,"
for example, the Sixth Circuit refused to extend immunity because
there was no basis at common law for granting qualified immunity
to private defendants. Likewise, in Manis v. Corrections Corporation of America,' the court determined that there was no precedent at common law for extending qualified immunity to a corporation operating a state prison.' On the other hand, those courts
that are more willing to look beyond the confines of a strict common law analysis will also be more likely to extend qualified immunity.
Part of the uncertainty concerning the scope of the qualified
immunity doctrine emerges from the courts' emphasis on policy
considerations.' Unlike the state action doctrine, which emphasizes the relationships and nexus between the government and the
private parties, the qualified immunity doctrine looks more to policy considerations. For example, in Manis, a district court in Tennessee stated that the test for immunity was "whether such an
immunity was recognized at common law when the statute was
enacted and whether public policy would support such an immunity."
In considering whether to extend qualified immunity to a
private corporation hired by a state to operate a prison, the court
concluded that the public policy considerations weighed against
extension of immunity.' Specifically, the court reasoned that private parties were not concerned with the public at large (as a public official would be), but only with the financial interests of the
corporation."
The reasoning in Manis suggests that the court is willing to
analyze the intent of the actors when considering whether to extend
qualified immunity in the future. This willingness was evidenced
when the court stated that "qualified immunity protects earnest

302. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980) (finding no history of
immunity for municipal corporations at that time).
303. 844 F.2d 1261, 1267 (6th Cir. 1988).
304. 859 F. Supp. 302, 306 (M.D. Tenn. 1994).
305. See id. at 303.
306. See, e.g., Folsom Inv. Co. v. Moore, 681 F.2d 1032, 1037 (5th Cir. 1982) (extendig immunity to defendants who had invoked an attachment statute).
307. See, e.g., Duncan, 844 F.2d at 1264.
308. Manis, 859 F.Supp. at 304.
309. See id. at 306.
310. See id. at 305.
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public officials who risk running afoul of the law in a genuine
effort to serve the public."' In fact, however, the intent is assumed rather than actually assessed. The court assumes that public
officials' intent is to serve the public to the best of his or her
ability,* and12 assumes that private actors have their own interests
paramount.
The difficulty with the court's reasoning is that it does not
help to determine the type of private actors who will be granted
immunity. By assuming that public officials have the public's best
interest at heart and that private actors do not, the court has essentially created a test in which all private contractors fail to have the
requisite intent. Like the private company overseeing the prison in
Manis, private tax collectors are in the business of collecting taxes
and reaping financial gain; they would never be granted qualified
immunity under the reasoning in Manis.
While the court's reasoning in Manis is not particularly helpful
in advancing the inquiry of how far to extend qualified immunity,
it does raise an important consideration. Manis suggests that all
private actors are different from all public actors, thereby begging
the question of whether there are two groups of private actors. In
other words, while there may be differences among public and private actors, there may also be differences among private actors.
The fear here is that in granting qualified immunity to a sub-group
of private actors (as in the sub-group of debt collectors who are
contracted by the government to collect delinquent taxes), different
intents and behaviors may emerge. Allowing a sub-group of debt
collectors to be free from privacy tort liability may lead to continued tortious behavior in non-tax collection situations or to changes
in other collectors' behaviors. These possible effects suggest that
qualified immunity is not a prudent choice.
A related policy inquiry is to determine the purpose of granting
immunity to private parties. In Wyatt v. Cole,"' the Supreme
Court stated that the ultimate goal of immunity is to "safeguard
government, and thereby to protect the public at large, not to benefit its agents."3 4 This statement suggests that the courts need to
consider the larger effects of granting immunity rather than focus

311.
312.
choice
313.
314.

Id. at 305.
This conception of the public/private intent distinction seems to be a mix of public
theory and communitarian theory.
504 U.S. 158 (1992).
Id. at 168.
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on the individual private tax collectors. If the focus is on the government, then granting immunity to private tax collectors does very
little to aid the government because public tax collectors continue
to collect taxes.
The above quoted statement in Wyatt also suggests that the
courts should consider the effect that granting immunity will have
on the government as a whole, rather than merely ensuring the
success of a particular program. If the focus is on the larger picture, then efficiency concerns become less persuasive. Instead of
focusing on efficiency in tax collection, for example, the focus is
on whether the government can function properly without the immunity. Because the government can function effectively in tax
collection (although not necessarily efficiently), there is little reason
to expand immunity to private collectors. Moreover, one of the
principle aims of privatization is to minimize government involvement. However, in granting immunity to private actors, a paradox
is created in which the effort to reduce government in fact expands
it.
The Manis court also argued that "the best policy is not to
afford them any immunity from suit" because "the threat of incurring money damages might provide the only incentive for a private
corporation and its employees to respect the Constitution."32 5 This
reasoning raises the most obvious reason for not extending the
qualified immunity status to private tax collectors-that individuals
will not have a recourse for breaches of privacy. So long as the
privacy tort exists and recognizes the public disclosure of private
facts as a viable claim, then all those who suffer from such a
breach ought to be able to recover.
In sum, private tax collectors will not be liable under the
FTCA, but it is also unlikely that they will be granted qualified
immunity. Private tax collectors will not be classified as state actors under either an express authorization test or a substantial relationship test, although they may meet the government function test
because tax collection is traditionally and inherently a governmental
function.
Despite the fact that private tax collectors fulfill the function
test, policy considerations require that they not be granted qualified
immunity. Granting immunity would not only create an unequal
treatment problem between debt collectors working for the govern-

315. Manis, 859 F. Supp. at 306 (emphasis omitted).

1997]

PRIVATE TAX COLLECTION

679

ment who had qualified immunity and those who did not work for
the government and had no such protection, but it could potentially
encourage different collection practices between the two groups.
Differing practices may lead to a lessening of standards. It is also
contrary to the general policy of immunity because the government
is able to function adequately without private tax collectors; granting immunity serves no substantial government purpose. It serves
only to protect the private tax collectors. Finally, granting immunity undermines an individual's ability to be made whole after being
wronged.
CONCLUSION

Justice Holmes stated in Compania General de Tabacos de
Filipinas v. Collector 16 that "[t]axes are what we pay for a civilized society. ' 317 While recognizing that the revenue generated
from taxes may enable a greater good, the same is not necessarily
true of tax collection. In fact, the government's means of tax collection can undermine the basic tenets of a civilized society if done
improperly and without regard for individual rights.
This Note argues that the private tax collection proposal undermines our society's basic notions of privacy. More specifically, it
is an impermissible infringement on existing statutory, constitutional, and tort law privacy rights. Private tax collection violates the
nondisclosure rule of § 6103 and transgresses the exception to the
FOIA for tax returns. The proposal is also a violation of the constitutional right to privacy because financial information is sufficiently private to fall under the rubric of private facts that demand
protection and because the state's interests in efficiency do not
outweigh the privacy interest. Finally, within tort law, private tax
collection is a breach of privacy that should not be protected by
qualified immunity because doing so would violate the traditional
policy reasons for granting immunity. Thus, the current private tax
collection proposal is legally flawed and should be discarded.
The above discussion also uses private tax collection as a case
study for privatization more generally. The broader conclusion that
this Note reaches is that there is a limit to the push for privatization, and that the limit rests within the realm of privacy rights.

316. 275 U.S. 87 (1927).
317. Id. at 100.
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This conclusion has implications for other privatization proposals;
inherently governmental functions that require disclosures of private
information cannot be privatized without jeopardizing citizens'
privacy rights. The zealous advocates of privatization must recognize this inherent limit to privatization in order for their proposals
to be successful.
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